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THE FILIBUSTER AND THE FRAMING: 
WHY THE CLOTURE RULE IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND  
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 
DAN T. COENEN* 
Abstract: The U.S. Senate’s handling of filibusters has changed dramatically in 
recent decades. As a result, the current sixty-vote requirement for invoking clo-
ture of debate does not produce protracted speechmaking on the Senate floor, as 
did predecessors of this rule in earlier periods of our history. Rather, the upper 
chamber now functions under a “stealth filibuster” system that in practical effect 
requires action by a supermajority to pass proposed bills. This Article demon-
strates why this system offends a constitutional mandate of legislative majoritari-
anism in light of well-established Framing-era understandings and governing 
substance-over-form principles of interpretation. Having established the presence 
of a constitutional violation, the Article turns to the subject of formulating a suit-
able remedy. As it shows, the Constitution does not require wholesale abandon-
ment of supermajority voting rules in the upper chamber. Instead, the Senate 
might opt for more nuanced approaches that carry forward its tradition of extend-
ed deliberation and careful attentiveness to the views of minority blocs, while 
providing in the end for majoritarian decision making in keeping with the Consti-
tution’s commands. 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Senate has grappled with “filibusters” from early in its 
history.1 The present-day chamber’s formal treatment of the subject finds ex-
pression in Senate Rule XXII, which requires sixty votes to end debate on 
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 1 The term “filibuster,” which derives from the Dutch word for “pirate,” initially referred to minority 
efforts to disrupt majority action in the Senate through the use of extended speechmaking. Ezra Klein, 
The Move to Reform the Filibuster, NEW YORKER, Jan. 28, 2013, at 24, 26; see also LAUREN C. BELL, 
FILIBUSTERING IN THE U.S. SENATE 10–11 (2011) (detailing the term’s origins). In recent decades, the 
term has been used more broadly, including by referring to forms of minority intervention that do not 
include speaking at all. See infra notes 151–165 and accompanying text. 
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most pending matters.2 This “Cloture Rule” has stirred intense disagreement. 
Proponents claim that it fosters deliberation, impedes majority overreaching, 
and differentiates the Senate from the House in salutary ways.3 Critics respond 
that the Rule breeds gridlock, contributes to political party polarization, and 
channels power to fractious minorities.4 
This Article does not consider these arguments. Instead, it addresses a dif-
ferent question: Does the Cloture Rule violate a constitutional mandate of leg-
islative majority rule? Some analysts have considered this question and shed 
valuable light on the subject.5 Even so, their work is incomplete. Of particular 
importance, both opponents and proponents of the Senate’s current regime 
have failed to take full account of the text of the Constitution and the historical 
backdrop against which the Framers crafted it.6 Nor have they considered re-
cent developments, including the use in November 2013 of the so-called “nu-
clear option” to alter cloture practice for some, but not all, confirmation votes 
                                                                                                                           
 2 Rule XXII states that whenever there is submitted “a motion, signed by sixteen senators, to 
bring to a close the debate upon any measure, motion, other matter pending before the Senate, or the 
unfinished business,” the Presiding officer shall cause the motion “at once” to be presented to the 
Senate. U.S. SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 
112-1, at 20–21 (2011) (Rule XXII). Then, if 
that question shall be decided in the affirmative by three-fifths of the Senators duly 
chosen and sworn—except on a measure or motion to amend the Senate rules, in which 
case the necessary affirmative vote shall be two-thirds of the Senators present and vot-
ing—then said measure, motion, or other matter pending before the Senate, or the un-
finished business, shall be the unfinished business to the exclusion of all other business 
until disposed of. 
Id. 
 3 See, e.g., SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE? FILIBUSTERING IN 
THE UNITED STATES SENATE 1 (1997) (suggesting that “[a]ccording to conventional wisdom,” Rule 
XXII safeguards “the right of unrestricted debate in the Senate,” helps “moderate extreme legislation” 
and carries forward the distinctive “origins and traditions of the Senate”); Orrin G. Hatch, Judicial 
Nomination Filibuster Cause and Cure, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 803, 831 (noting that filibuster-rule pro-
ponents claim that its absence would cause the minority to “simply . . . be ‘stampeded’ or ‘steam-
rolled’”). See generally RICHARD A. ARENBERG & ROBERT B. DOVE, DEFENDING THE FILIBUSTER 
(2012) (setting forth an extended defense of the supermajority-based cloture system). 
 4 See, e.g., Tom Harkin, Fixing the Filibuster: Restoring Real Democracy in the Senate, 95 IOWA 
L. REV. BULL. 67, 77 (2010) (arguing that under the filibuster “there is no incentive for the minority 
to compromise” so that its elimination would make minority Senators “more willing to come to the 
table and negotiate,” while majority Senators would “have an incentive to compromise because they 
will want to save time”). 
 5 See, e.g., Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1011–
16 (2011) (making an argument from background principles that the filibuster violates constitutional 
principles of majority rule); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 
181, 239–45 (1997) (arguing that the principle of majority rule is insufficient to support a finding that 
the filibuster is unconstitutional). 
 6 See Dan T. Coenen, The Originalist Case Against Congressional Supermajority Voting Rules, 
106 NW. U. L. REV. 1091, 1094–95 (2012). 
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on presidential nominees.7 Focusing on these matters, this Article demonstrates 
why the Senate’s current use of Rule XXII clashes with governing constitu-
tional law. 
The development of this thesis proceeds in three steps. Part I identifies 
the two claimed sources of constitutional authority for the Cloture Rule, there-
by setting the stage for a systematic critique.8 The first source is the Any-
Voting-Number Theory, which posits that Article I’s Rules of Proceedings 
Clause permits the Senate to impose on itself whatever vote-total requirements 
it prefers for any action it might take, including the passage of ordinary laws.9 
The second claimed source of authority is the Just-a-Debating-Rule Theory, 
which rests on the idea that the Rules of Proceedings Clause at least permits 
each chamber of Congress to establish procedures for its own internal, day-to-
day operations.10 In other words, even if the Senate cannot establish superma-
jority voting requirements for substantive decisions about whether to pass bills 
or confirm nominees, it may do so for procedural decisions about when to end 
debate.11 Rule XXII, so the argument goes, embodies just this sort of permissi-
ble procedural choice. 
Parts II and III of this Article consider these defenses in turn. Part II 
demonstrates that the Any-Voting-Number Theory fails because the Constitu-
tion establishes that the Senate must engage in ordinary lawmaking by way of 
majority vote and cannot alter that requirement by way of rulemaking.12 This 
conclusion finds support in the text of the Constitution as illuminated by com-
                                                                                                                           
 7 See infra notes 280–286 and accompanying text (describing the Senate majority’s use of the so-
called “nuclear option” on November 21, 2013 to require only fifty-one votes to secure cloture on 
confirmations for all presidential nominees except Supreme Court Justices). 
 8 See infra notes 24–50 and accompanying text. 
 9 This term, like the term “Just-a-Debating-Rule Theory” set forth below, has been coined by the 
author. See infra notes 44–48 and accompanying text. For the most elaborate developments of the 
Any-Voting Number Theory, see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of 
Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483 (1995) [hereinafter McGinnis 
& Rappaport I]; John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Rights of Legislators and the 
Wrongs of Interpretation: A Further Defense of the Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority 
Rules, 47 DUKE L.J. 327 (1997) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport II]. The Rules of Proceedings 
Clause, which appears in Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution, specifies that “each House may de-
termine the Rules of its Proceedings.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5. 
 10 See, e.g., Josh Chafetz & Michael J. Gerhardt, Is the Filibuster Constitutional?, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. PENNUMBRA 245, 264 (2010), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/158-U-Pa-L-Rev-
PENNumbra-245.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CRM4-L9ED (Gerhardt) (indicating that the Rules 
of Proceedings Clause “pertains to the Senate’s power to devise the rules for its internal governance”). 
 11 See id. at 263 (Gerhardt) (arguing that the Rules of Proceedings Clause “plainly grants to the 
Senate plenary authority to devise procedures for internal governance, and the filibuster is a rule for 
debate”); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 445, 
456–57 (2004) (arguing that Rule XXII “does not require 60 votes to adopt a law; it requires at least 
60 votes to end debate”). 
 12 See infra notes 51–124 and accompanying text. 
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mon understandings that prevailed at the time of the framing.13 Part III turns to 
the Just-a-Debating-Rule Theory.14 The essential problem with this defense of 
the Cloture Rule is that the Rule in its current operation does not—to say the 
least—concern just debate. Rather, the Senate’s cloture practice has evolved to 
a point that it has nothing of significance to do with debating and everything to 
do with substantive decision making. Given this reality, the sixty-vote Cloture 
Rule works in practice as a supermajority voting requirement. And because the 
Rule operates in this way, it is invalid because “the Constitution is concerned, 
not with form, but with substance.”15 
Part IV takes up the task of devising a suitable constitutional remedy for 
the constitutional wrong established in Parts I through III, focusing attention 
on two remedial possibilities.16 The first would provide for a final up-or-down 
majority vote on any matter put forward in a timely fashion, but only after af-
fording objectors an extended opportunity to register disagreement and press 
for change.17 The second would return the Senate to filibustering in its histori-
cal form, thus refocusing votes under Rule XXII on the cloture of true 
speechmaking on the Senate floor.18 The underlying purpose of both of these 
remedies is the same—to ensure that determinative actions in the upper cham-
ber will be controlled in the end by a majority, rather than a supermajority, 
vote. 
                                                                                                                           
 13 In particular, the self-imposition of supermajority voting rules stands at odds with five key 
elements of our framing history: (1) the majority-rule-centered background assumptions about how 
legislative decision making should work that marked the founding period; (2) then-ascendant philo-
sophical commitments to the essential role of majoritarianism within republican systems; (3) the 
Framers’ focused goal of abandoning supermajority voting requirements because those very require-
ments had immobilized the government under the Articles of Confederation; (4) the forging at the 
Philadelphia Convention of compromises that were premised on congressional majoritarianism in 
enacting laws; and (5) the teachings of The Federalist. See infra notes 51–124 and accompanying text. 
To be sure, one might seek to defend self-imposed supermajority voting rules under a theory of consti-
tutional interpretation that accords only limited weight to the document’s text, history, and design. 
Nonetheless, no one has sought to make such a case. Cf. McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 9, at 
485–500 (defending the Any-Voting-Number Theory solely on originalist grounds). Indeed, even 
critics of the filibuster regime not commonly associated with originalist methodologies have not en-
dorsed such a nonoriginalist approach. See Bruce Ackerman et al., An Open Letter to Congressman 
Gingrich, 104 YALE L.J. 1539, 1539–43 (1995) (setting forth a critique—endorsed by Professors 
Ackerman, Amar, Balkin, Bloch, Bobbit, Fallon, Kahn, Kurland, Laycock, Levinson, Michelman, 
Perry, Post, Rubenfeld, Strauss, Sunstein, and Wellington—of the Any-Voting-Number theory based 
primarily on text, history, and structure). This result is not surprising because, among other things, 
text and history do not stand alone in supporting the rejection of the Any-Voting-Number Theory. By 
way of example, powerful considerations rooted in republican self-rule and common-sense efforts to 
avoid anomalous results point to the same conclusion. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage 
Majority Rule in Congress, 46 DUKE L.J. 73, 75 (1996). 
 14 See infra notes 125–271 and accompanying text. 
 15 See Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931). 
 16 See infra notes 272–311 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 287–299 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 300–311 and accompanying text. 
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The federal courts have not yet resolved whether they have the power to 
rule on the constitutionality of the Cloture Rule.19 That subject is best left to 
others, who can give it the full treatment that limitations of time, space, and 
energy render impossible here.20 The bracketing of this question, however, in 
no way diminishes the importance of the matter that this Article addresses. The 
key point is this: Even if courts find themselves unable to consider the Cloture 
Rule’s constitutionality, Article VI requires Senators—no less than judges—to 
take an oath to support the Constitution, and so they must honor the limits it 
imposes.21 Indeed, it is all the more essential for Senators to assess the consti-
tutionality of their own rules if judges lack authority to do so.22 This Article 
demonstrates why Senators, and particularly—though not only23—originalist-
minded Senators, have no choice but to look at the Cloture Rule in a new light. 
They must do so because the analysis offered here shows that this Rule has 
come to contravene the fundamental principle of legislative majoritarianism 
established by our founding charter. 
I. CONTEXTUALIZING THE FILIBUSTER DEBATE 
In due course, this Article will canvass the history of the Senate’s regula-
tion of speechmaking by its members.24 For now, it suffices to note a point es-
tablished by that history that is of central importance: A “stealth filibuster” sys-
tem has taken hold in the upper chamber in recent years,25 and that system has 
altered Senate decision making in a game-changing way.26 In particular, unlike 
                                                                                                                           
 19 In a recent ruling, a federal district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction on the facts of 
the case to consider this question. Common Cause v. Biden, 909 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12–13 (D.D.C. 2012), 
appeal filed, No. 12-5412 (D.C. Cir. June 18, 2013). Just as this issue went to press, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit heard oral arguments in the case on January 21, 2014. Courtroom 
Minutes of Oral Argument, Common Cause, No. 12-5412 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 2014), ECF No. 33. 
 20 Compare Emmet J. Bondurant, The Senate Filibuster: The Politics of Obstruction, 48 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 467, 500–07 (2011) (arguing that courts have jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of 
the Cloture Rule), and Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 225–38 (same), with Chafetz, supra note 
5, at 1036–37 (arguing that courts do not have jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of the Clo-
ture Rule). 
 21 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3; Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 586–88 (1975) (discussing the duties of legislators to 
assess the constitutionality of proposed legislation). 
 22 See Chafetz & Gerhardt, supra note 10, at 251 (Chafetz) (noting that, when courts “underen-
force . . . constitutional norms,” it is “all the more important for constitutionally conscientious mem-
bers of Congress to take them very seriously”); Neals-Erik William Delker, The House Three-Fifths 
Tax Rule: Majority Rule, the Framers’ Intent, and the Judiciary’s Role, 100 DICK. L. REV. 341, 380 
(1996) (same). 
 23 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 130–165 and accompanying text. 
 25 Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 186. 
 26 See infra notes 151–193 and accompanying text (discussing the “stealth filibuster” and its ef-
fects on modern Senate operations). 
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their predecessors, present-day Senators need not speak on the Senate floor—
or even mount a serious threat to speak—to block proposals that enjoy majori-
ty support.27 Moreover, this new system has contributed to such an expanded 
use of the filibuster mechanism that Senate practice in effect now requires six-
ty votes as a routine matter to enact most legislation.28 Even in 1997, Profes-
sors Catherine Fisk and Erwin Chemerinsky could rightly claim that “[t]his 
history reveals a fundamental change in the nature of filibustering and a dra-
matic increase in the power of a filibuster threat.”29 As it turns out, this state-
ment is even more accurate today.30 
In recent years, critics have drawn on these points to mount constitutional 
challenges to the operation of Rule XXII.31 Although these challenges have 
taken a variety of forms, the most direct line of attack finds expression in a 
simple syllogism: 
Major Premise: The Constitution establishes that a bill “shall have 
passed” the House or the Senate, for purposes of the Presentment 
Clause, if it has received a majority vote; thus, a rule that requires a 
supermajority vote to enact a law is unconstitutional.32 
 
Minor Premise: The modern filibuster rule is not really a rule about 
debating; instead, in practical effect—and thus for controlling legal 
purposes—it is a rule that requires a supermajority vote to enact a 
law.33 
 
Conclusion: The modern filibuster rule is unconstitutional. 
Defenders of current Senate practice seek to fend off this argument in two 
ways. First, they invoke the Any-Voting-Number Theory to attack the syllo-
gism’s major premise.34 Second, they invoke the Just-a-Debating-Rule Theory 
to attack its minor premise.35 
One might also seek to argue that this syllogistic argument concerns only 
bill passing and, therefore, has no effect on the constitutionality of supermajor-
ity cloture practice in the context of voting to confirm presidential nominees. 
                                                                                                                           
 27 See infra notes 151–156 and accompanying text. 
 28 Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 182. 
 29 Id. at 186. 
 30 See infra notes 157–158, 193 and accompanying text. 
 31 See, e.g., Bondurant, supra note 20, at 470–79 (reviewing historical developments in building a 
case against modern practice); Chafetz, supra note 5, at 1006–16 (same). 
 32 See infra notes 51–78 and accompanying text. The relevant “shall have passed” language ap-
pears in Article I, Section 7. 
 33 See infra notes 151–193 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 44–48 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
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Of importance, however, no scholar has argued—at least in a focused and 
thorough way—that today’s supermajoritarian filibuster system can continue to 
operate in the confirmation context even if that system is unconstitutional as to 
bill enactment under the syllogism set forth above. To be sure, some commen-
tators have offered policy arguments that support looking with special favor on 
supermajority-approval rules when the Senate votes on judicial nominees, in-
cluding for the Supreme Court.36 On the other hand, two major works defend 
just the opposite conclusion—namely, that supermajority-approval require-
ments for confirming judges are especially problematic, including because of 
the affront they pose to the President’s appointment power.37 In the end, these 
cross-cutting structural arguments may cancel each other out, thus supporting 
the conclusion that the ban on supermajority approval applies equally to pro-
posed laws and pending nominations. 
The more critical point is that the Constitution’s text and history cut 
sharply against distinguishing between bill votes and confirmation votes in this 
context. To begin with, Article II’s unitary textual treatment of judicial-branch 
and executive-branch nominees counsels against countenancing a different 
treatment of the two groups with regard to permissible forms of senatorial 
“consent,”38 and the argument seems especially weak for authorizing superma-
jority-approval requirements for the President’s own key executive-branch as-
sistants. Moreover, vigorous arguments for not applying supermajority voting 
requirements to executive-branch and lower court judicial nominees took cen-
ter stage in the most recent debates over filibuster reform.39 In any event, there 
are many indications, in both the constitutional text and our constitutional his-
tory, that the ratifying community was committed to legislative majoritarian-
                                                                                                                           
 36 See, e.g., Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Filibustering Judicial Nomina-
tions, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 337 (2005) (positing that, because “federal judges . . . hold their 
positions for life, subject only to the . . . unlikely possibility of impeachment,” it is “misguided to 
criticize filibustering judicial nominations as anti-majoritarian, when the entire nature of the federal 
judiciary is anti-majoritarian”); Bruce Ackerman, Editorial, Filibuster Reform Both Parties Can Agree 
On, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2011, at A15 (“[G]iven their power to second guess democratic decisions, 
judicial nominees should gain bipartisan support.”). 
 37 See John Cornyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the Need for Filibuster Re-
form, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 201 (2003) (arguing that “the constitutional structure of our 
government dictates that the Senate’s power with respect to nominations is necessarily narrower than 
its power with respect to legislation”); Hatch, supra note 3, at 830 (advancing a similar argument). 
 38 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 39 See infra notes 280–286 and accompanying text; see also Jonathan Weisman & Jennifer Stein-
hauer, Senate Strikes Filibuster Deal at Last Minute, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2013, at A1 (quoting Sena-
tor Harry Reid as stating that the filibuster deal ensures that “[q]ualified executive nominees [can] not 
be blocked on procedural supermajority votes”); Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, Senate’s Lead-
er Sets Showdown over Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2013, at A1 (reporting on the plan of Senate 
Majority Leader Harry Reid “to ask a majority of members to ban filibusters against executive nomi-
nees”). 
46 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:39 
ism as a general matter.40 In particular, nothing in the historical record indi-
cates that the Framers, who were unstintingly committed to legislative majori-
tarianism in enacting laws, were any less committed to such majoritarianism in 
confirming either judges or executive-branch officials.41 
For these reasons, there is no apparent basis for concluding that Senate 
confirmation votes occupy a different status than Senate bill votes when it 
comes to the constitutional permissibility of self-imposed supermajority voting 
rules. Moreover, if this proposition is sound, it follows that all attempted uses 
of Rule XXII—whether for bill enactments or nominee confirmations of any 
kind—must fail unless that Rule finds support in either the Any-Voting-
Number Theory or the Just-a-Debating-Rule Theory. 
The Just-a-Debating-Rule defense of the Cloture Rule is not hard to fol-
low. It posits that constitutional analysts should consider the Cloture Rule on 
its own terms; that those terms establish that the Rule concerns debate; and that 
the control of debate is permissible because the Constitution vests the Senate 
with the power to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”42 Put another way, 
the Cloture Rule on its face addresses the ending of debate, and that is enough 
to establish its constitutionality because rules about debate govern how legisla-
tive “Proceedings” unfold.43 
The Any-Voting-Number Theory, by contrast, does not focus on the de-
bate-centered language and lineage of Rule XXII. Instead, its origins lie in the 
midterm election of 1994, which swept Republican majorities into both the 
House and the Senate as a result of political campaigns built around then-
Speaker Newt Gingrich’s “Contract for America.”44 One change made pursu-
ant to this “Contract” involved a new House Rule that required any bill involv-
ing a federal income tax rate increase to receive the approval of at least three-
fifths of voting Representatives.45 For the first time in American history, this 
rule raised the question of whether a chamber of Congress could impose on 
itself a supermajority voting requirement for the actual enactment of laws.46 At 
the time, some scholars insisted that the Constitution prohibits any supermajor-
ity voting requirement applicable to a final bill vote, even if a majority remains 
                                                                                                                           
 40 See infra notes 55–124 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra notes 55–124 and accompanying text. 
 42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. For the text of Rule XXII, see supra note 2. 
 43 See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
 44 See Paul West, GOP Sweeps to Victory in Momentous Power Shift; Glendening, Sauerbrey 
Finish in Dead Heat; GOP Takes Control of Both House, Senate, BALT. SUN, Nov. 9, 1994, at A1, 
available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1994-11-09/news/1994313135_1_house-republican-rep-
first-republican-speaker, archived at http://perma.cc/9RB9-UNBY. 
 45 The original House Rule was set forth at H.R. Res. 6, 104th Cong. § 106(a) (1995) (stating that 
any bill “carrying a Federal income tax rate increase may not be considered as passed or agreed to 
unless so determined by a vote of not less than three-fifths of the Members voting”). 
 46 See Ackerman et al., supra note 13, at 1539 (noting the rule’s “unprecedented” nature). 
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free to repeal that requirement.47 Critics shot back that the Framers did not set 
forth this proposition in explicit terms and that the House’s new three-fifths 
bill-voting requirement qualified—just like the Cloture Rule—as a permissible 
“Rule[] of its Proceedings.”48 
In sum, there are two separate defenses of the Senate filibuster rule. The 
first—the Any-Voting-Number-Theory—posits that the constitutional defense 
of the tax-vote-increase House Rule is sound and applicable a fortiori to the 
Senate Cloture Rule.49 In other words, if the Rules of Proceedings Clause au-
thorizes a chamber of Congress to adopt an explicit supermajority voting rule 
for passing bills, it logically must also authorize an implicit supermajority vot-
ing rule, even assuming the Cloture Rule merits this description. The second 
defense—the Just-a-Debating-Rule Theory—reflects the view that the Cloture 
Rule does not target final Senate votes as either an explicit or an implicit mat-
ter.50 Rather, it is a rule about cutting off debate. And for this reason, it falls 
within the chamber’s express power to adopt “Rules of . . . Proceedings,” even 
if the House and Senate may not impose on themselves supermajority voting 
rules for final actions in passing laws or confirming nominees. In the pages 
that follow, this Article demonstrates why each of these two defenses fails, so 
that Rule XXII is unconstitutional as it operates today. 
II. THE ANY-VOTING-NUMBER THEORY 
The first defense of the Senate’s modern filibuster regime rests on the 
Any-Voting-Number Theory. This defense must fail, however, if the Constitu-
tion requires final action on passing bills and confirming nominees to proceed 
by majority vote. In fact, the Constitution does impose a majority-vote re-
quirement for these dispositive actions, as a unanimous Supreme Court recog-
nized in United States v. Ballin in 1892.51 The Court in that case put the point 
this way: 
[T]he general rule of all parliamentary bodies is that, when a quor-
um is present, the act of a majority of the quorum is the act of the 
body. This has been the rule for all time, except so far as in any giv-
en case the terms of the organic act under which the body is assem-
bled have prescribed specific limitations. . . . No such limitation is 
                                                                                                                           
 47 See id. at 1542; Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 88–89. 
 48 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. For extensive treatments of the subject, see generally McGinnis & 
Rappaport I, supra note 9; McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 9. 
 49 See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text. 
 50 See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
 51 144 U.S. 1 (1892). 
48 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:39 
found in the Federal Constitution, and therefore the general law of 
such bodies obtains.52 
Some commentators have argued that this pronouncement, at least if given its 
most natural reading, is off the mark.53 In reality, however, the text and the his-
tory of our Constitution firmly establish the principle of majority decision 
making recognized in Ballin.54 
A. Text 
The text of the Constitution negates the Any-Voting-Number Theory in 
four separate ways. First, Article I, Section 7 states that “[e]very Bill which 
shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate . . . shall . . . be 
presented to the President.”55 The critical term in this clause is “passed,” which 
Americans understood at the time of the framing—as Ballin confirms—to 
hinge on “the act of a majority of a quorum” in the absence of “specific limita-
tions . . . found in the Federal Constitution” itself.56 This understanding finds 
support in established practice at the time of the framing,57 Noah Webster’s 
dictionary of 1828,58 and the two English legal dictionaries that existed in 
1787.59 It follows that the Any-Voting-Number Theory clashes with the most 
natural linguistic understanding of the word “passed” as used in Article I, Sec-
tion 7.60 The theory also falters because it would permit the Senate—and the 
House, too—to fashion a crazy quilt of wildly varying submajority and super-
                                                                                                                           
 52 Id. at 6. 
 53 See McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 9, at 493 (rejecting the “first appearances” of state-
ments in Ballin in favor of the Any-Voting-Number Theory). 
 54 This conclusion draws support from later Supreme Court decisions that reflect the same under-
standing expressed in Ballin. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956 n.21, 958 (1983) (alluding with-
out qualification to “the simple majority required for passage of legislation,” and reiterating that en-
actment of legislation requires “passage by a majority of both Houses”); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 
248 U.S. 276, 283 (1919) (noting the early rejection of a constitutional amendment that would have 
“required a two-thirds (instead of a majority) vote . . . concerning specified subjects” (emphasis add-
ed)). 
 55 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 56 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 57 See infra notes 79–124 and accompanying text. 
 58 See 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 31 (New 
York, S. Converse 1828) (setting forth definitions of “pass” that include “to receive the sanction of a 
legislative house or body by a majority of votes”). 
 59 See 2 T. CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY 5 (London, His Majesty’s 
Law Printers 1771) (including in definition of “majority” the following: “The only method of deter-
mining the acts of many is by a majority; the major part of members of parliament enact laws . . . .”); 
GILES JACOB, THE NEW LAW DICTIONARY 354 (London, Henry Lintot 1743) (including in the defini-
tion of “majority” that “it is the Majority of Members of Parliament, which enact our Laws”). 
 60 See Coenen, supra note 6, at 1098–99. 
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majority voting requirements in derogation of the Framers’ goal of establishing 
a “single, finely wrought . . . procedure” for enacting federal laws.61 
Second, Article I, Section 7 goes on to state that, in the event of a veto of 
a passed bill, the President “shall return it” to the chamber in which it originat-
ed.62 Then, if “two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be 
sent . . . to the other House, . . . and if approved by two thirds of that House, it 
shall become a Law.”63 As these words reveal on their face, the two-thirds vote 
total for overriding a presidential veto cannot be increased to a higher num-
ber.64 According to the Any-Voting-Number Theory, however, the Senate on its 
own could set the controlling measure for the initial vote on a bill at 75% or 
even 100%.65 Could the Framers really have intended to permit the act of ordi-
nary lawmaking to proceed by unanimous vote, while simultaneously specify-
ing that a two-thirds vote must determine the override of a presidential veto? 
The utter oddity of such a system confirms the conclusion that a bill is 
“passed” in the first instance when it receives majority approval.66 
Third, Article I, Section 3 specifies that the Vice President shall serve as 
President of the Senate, “but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divid-
ed.”67 Notwithstanding this textual vesting of voting power in the Vice Presi-
dent, the Any-Voting-Number Theory posits that the Senate can strip the Vice 
President of any vote on all substantive matters by simply specifying via rule 
that a supermajority—or even a fifty-one-vote simple majority of Senators 
themselves, excluding the Vice President—is needed to act.68 That view of 
things, however, is irreconcilable with the Vice President Voting Clause be-
cause it permits a nullification of the “casting vote” —that is, the “vote . . . 
which decides the question”69—that the Framers meant for the Vice President 
                                                                                                                           
 61 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951. 
 62 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 63 Id. 
 64 This conclusion follows from the clause’s specification that, following a veto, a bill reapproved 
by two-thirds of each chamber “shall become a Law.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 65 See McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 9, at 489 (acknowledging that “the Constitution per-
mits [the houses] to choose unusual or odd proportions”). 
 66 Finding merit in this critique, Professors Fisk and Chemerinsky suggest that the Framers may 
have meant that the controlling number of votes for the initial passage of bills would have to fall 
somewhere between 51% and 66%. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 242. For an argument that 
this extrapolation finds no support in the Framing-era materials, see Coenen, supra note 6, at 1101–
03. 
 67 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. 
 68 See McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 9, at 488–89 (arguing that the Vice President Voting 
Clause assumes that majority rule, with ties broken by the Vice President, would be only “the default 
rule applied when no other procedure was adopted”). 
 69 See 1 WEBSTER, supra note 58, at 33 (defining “casting-vote” to mean “[t]he vote of a presid-
ing officer, in an assembly or council, which decides a question, when the votes of the assembly or 
house are equally divided”). 
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to have.70 Put simply, Article I, Section 3 shows that the Framers meant for 
final Senate action on proposed matters to hinge on the vote of a legislative 
majority, with the Vice President’s vote to determine whether an aye-voting or 
nay-voting majority exists in the event that the Senators themselves are “equal-
ly divided.” 
Finally, the Constitution specifies five and only five instances in which 
the chambers of Congress are to act by supermajority vote.71 This list is limited 
to matters of extraordinary importance—namely, the expulsion of an elected 
representative,72 senatorial conviction of the President or others on impeach-
ment charges,73 senatorial confirmation of treaties,74 the proposal of constitu-
tional amendments,75 and, as already noted, the override of presidential ve-
toes.76 Under the Any-Voting-Number Theory, however, each chamber of Con-
gress could add to this list in any way it might like. Indeed, the Senate could 
provide that passing even the most mundane and inconsequential bills requires 
unanimity, although the Constitution would specifically bar it from, for exam-
ple, requiring more than a two-thirds vote to approve a treaty.77 Such a free-
form conception of the bill-enactment process is at odds with the cautious 
treatment of supermajority voting laid down in the constitutional text. In par-
ticular, it runs up against the Framers’ demonstrated understanding—noted by 
Joseph Story nearly two-hundred years ago—that “departure from the general 
rule, of the right of the majority to govern, ought not to be allowed but upon 
the most urgent occasions.”78 
                                                                                                                           
 70 See 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 238 (O.W. Holmes, Jr., ed., 12th ed., 
Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1873) (1826) (setting forth Kent’s text of the 1820s that “the Vice-
President . . . gives the casting vote when they are equally divided”); 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVER-
AL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 489–90 (Jonathan El-
liot ed., Washington 1836) (statement of James Monroe) (stating that the Vice President “is to have 
the casting vote in the Senate”); Remarks of Robert Whitehill to the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 7, 
1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 512, 512 
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) (noting that the Vice President “has the casting vote in the Senate”); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 461 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (noting that the Vice 
President “should have only a casting vote”); see also THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIA-
MENTARY PRACTICE: FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 133 (Washington, Joseph 
Milligan & William Cooper 1812) (“In Senate, if they be equally divided, the Vice-President an-
nounces his opinion, which decides.”). 
 71 See infra notes 72–76 and accompanying text. 
 72 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
 73 Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
 74 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 75 Id. art. V. 
 76 Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 77 The unalterable nature of the two-thirds voting measure for treaty ratification is established by 
the specification in Article II, Section 2 that the President “shall have Power . . . to make Treaties, 
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.” Id. art. II, § 2. 
 78 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 887 (Bos-
ton, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833). 
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B. Historical Context 
The context in which the Constitution was adopted confirms that the 
Framers meant to permit the House and Senate to pass ordinary legislation, and 
by logical extension to confirm nominees,79 only by way of majority—and not 
supermajority—vote.80 To begin with, longstanding practice in both England 
and America established that dispositive legislative decision making was to be 
done by legislative majorities. Parliament had always acted by majority vote.81 
Founding-era state legislatures likewise uniformly adhered to this practice,82 as 
did the state ratifying conventions83 and the Philadelphia Convention itself.84 
Indeed, at the Convention, no less worldly a man than Benjamin Franklin de-
clared that supermajority voting rules were “contrary to the common practice 
of Assemblies in all Countries and Ages.”85 
Legislative majoritarianism also comported with fundamental Framing-
era conceptions of republican theory.86 The core idea was that self-rule in its 
nature required majority rule if in fact “all men are created equal.”87 Other-
wise, minorities could and would wield governing powers, just as they had 
done under aristocratic systems.88 As Thomas Jefferson explained, “The first 
principle of republicanism is, that the lex-majoris partis is the fundamental law 
of every society of individuals of equal rights . . . .”89 John Locke made the 
                                                                                                                           
 79 See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text. 
 80 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008) (noting that constitutional interpretation 
should take account of “history . . . known to the Framers”). 
 81 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *181 (“In each house the act of the ma-
jority binds the whole . . . .”). See generally Chafetz, supra note 5, at 1017–23 (discussing parliamen-
tary norms in detail). 
 82 See, e.g., AKHIL R. AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND 
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 359 (2012) (observing that “neither Parliament nor any state circa 1787 
generally required more than simple house majority votes for the passage of bills or the adoption of 
internal house procedures, even though, in many of these states, no explicit clause specified this vot-
ing rule,” and that “[i]n America circa 1787, majority rule in these contexts truly did go without say-
ing”). In one essay published in the midst of the ratification process, the author observed: “I can con-
ceive no reason why the ordinary business of legislation should not be determined in Congress by a 
majority of voices as is done in all our assemblies, and other public bodies.” An Independent Free-
holder, WINCHESTER VA. GAZETTE, Jan. 25, 1788, reprinted in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 325–26 (John P Kaminski et al. eds., 2009) (emphasis 
added). 
 83 See AMAR, supra note 82, at 368 (noting that the majority-vote principle “had gone without 
saying in each ratifying convention in 1787–1788”). 
 84 See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 8, 11 (Max Farrand ed., rev. 
ed. 1966). 
 85 Id. at 198. 
 86 See generally Coenen, supra note 6, at 1132–39 (discussing intense notions of republicanism at 
the Framing). 
 87 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 88 Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9–10 (outlawing titles of nobility). 
 89 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Baron F.H. Alexander Von Humboldt (June 13, 1817), in 10 
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 88, 89 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s 
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same point when he wrote that in organizations “impowered to act by positive 
laws, where no number is set down by that positive law which impowers them, 
the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole, and, of course, deter-
mines, as having by the law of nature and reason the power of the whole.”90 
Professor Akhil Amar underscored the key point when he observed that “this 
linkage between Republicanism and majority rule runs throughout . . . Found-
ing era discourse . . . .”91 
To be sure, the Articles of Confederation departed from this pattern by re-
quiring supermajority approval of many actions in the pre-Constitution federal 
Congress.92 But that departure reflected the distinctive role of the Articles as a 
confederation-based treaty among turf-protecting states, rather than a charter 
of national self-governance built on republican principles.93 Even more signifi-
cantly, the core purpose of the new Constitution was to jettison the Articles and 
the “frail and tottering edifice” it had created.94 Most important of all, the 
move to repudiate the Articles was propelled in large measure by condemna-
tion of the very supermajority voting rules they had put in place.95 As James 
Wilson emphasized at the Philadelphia Convention, “[g]reat inconveniences 
had . . . been experienced in Congress from the article of confederation requir-
ing nine votes in certain cases.”96 It strains credulity to suppose that the same 
men who emphatically rejected the Articles’ supermajority voting requirements 
because of their “contemptible” and “embarrass[ing]” effects97 simultaneously 
intended that the newly created federal legislature could freely reinstall them.98 
                                                                                                                           
Sons 1899); accord, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1785), reprinted 
in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 23, 171 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975) (characterizing majori-
ty rule as “the natural law of every assembly of men, whose numbers are not fixed by any other law”); 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Deputies of the Cherokee Upper Towns (Jan. 9, 1809), in 8 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 228, 229 (H.A. Washington ed., New York, Derby & Jackson 
1859) (“Our way is . . . to consider that as law for which the majority votes.”). 
 90 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 96, at 55 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., 
Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1952) (1690). 
 91 Akhil R. Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Major-
ity Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 757 (1994). 
 92 See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 9, at 341–42. 
 93 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 82, at 57 (noting that, in contrast to the state of affairs created by 
the Constitution, “each of the thirteen states was a legally sovereign entity” under the Articles and the 
“Confederation itself was merely a ‘league of friendship,’” which “[t]he Philadelphia framers were 
proposing to dissolve”). 
 94 THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, supra note 70, at 98 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 95 See, e.g., BINDER & SMITH, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that “the experiment with supermajorities 
under the Articles of Confederation had been a dismal one” and that key Framers “did not intend to 
repeat it under the new Constitution”). 
 96 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 84, at 451 (remarks of 
James Wilson). 
 97 THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 70, at 141–42 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 98 Some proponents of the filibuster system are drawn to statements such as Professor Michael 
Gerhardt’s assertion that “the lawmaking process in Article I was designed to be cumbersome—to 
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The Framers’ crafting of the Great Compromise confirms their commit-
ment to subjecting votes on bills to unmodifiable majority control, especially 
in the Senate.99 At the outset of the Constitutional Convention, delegates from 
its namesake state put forward the “Virginia Plan.”100 Under this proposal, 
each state’s population would determine its level of representation in both the 
House and the Senate—a proposition seen by large-state delegates as com-
manded by republican principles.101 Small-state delegates, however, assailed 
this approach, thus thrusting the Convention into a deadlock that nearly caused 
its collapse.102 Delegates worked through the impasse only after weeks of 
wrangling when the barest of majorities approved the Great Compromise,103 
which fixed representation in the House according to population, while giving 
each state an “equal voice” in the Senate.104 The critical point is that the “equal 
voice” the Framers envisioned was not the minority-favoring unequal voice 
that supermajority voting rules put in place. To be sure, a majority of delega-
tions signed on to a hard-fought compromise under which the seven smallest 
states, then representing some 28% of the national population, could block by 
way of a majority vote legislation favored by the six largest states, representing 
the other 72%.105 But these delegations never would have embraced a system 
                                                                                                                           
make it harder, not easier, to enact laws.” Chafetz & Gerhardt, supra note 10, at 264 (Gerhardt). Any 
argument based on this notion, however, involves an effort to extract original meaning from an ex-
tremely general proposition and overreaches because the Framers did not mean to make it hard to pass 
laws in any way possible. Rather, their pointed repudiation of supermajority voting rules, based on the 
recent and concrete harms such rules had inflicted under the Articles, reveals a decisive rejection of 
them as a tool to constrain legislative action. 
 99 For one treatment of the Great Compromise, see DAVID O. STEWART, THE SUMMER OF 1787: 
THE MEN WHO INVENTED THE CONSTITUTION 119–27 (2007). 
 100 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 84, at 27–28 & n.20. 
 101 See, e.g., RALPH KETCHAM, THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION DEBATES 11 (2003) (noting particularly strong views of Madison and Wilson on this 
point). 
 102 See STEWART, supra note 99, at 114 (noting that “[d]elegates spoke openly of throwing in the 
towel and quitting the Convention” over the issue of small-state representation). 
 103 Id. at 124 (noting that the “compromise was approved by the narrowest of margins, 5–4, with 
Massachusetts divided”). 
 104 KETCHAM, supra note 101, at 11. 
 105 According to the 1790 census, Delaware (with a population of 50,209), Rhode Island (67,877), 
Georgia (53,284), New Hampshire (141,727), South Carolina (141,979), New Jersey (172,716), and 
Connecticut (235,182), were the seven smallest states, representing 862,974 people out of a total of 
3,113,834 persons in the United States. This total excludes persons who lived in U.S. Territories, 
including the then-non-state Vermont, while including persons in Maine and Kentucky as residents of 
Massachusetts and Virginia, respectively. In addition, these numbers reflect the four non-slave catego-
ries of persons enumerated in the 1790 census: “Free white Males of 16 years and upwards, including 
heads of families”; “Free white Males under sixteen years”; “Free white Females, including heads of 
families”; and “All other free persons.” See THOMAS JEFFERSON, OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE, 
RETURN OF THE WHOLE NUMBER OF PERSONS WITHIN THE SEVERAL DISTRICTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES 3 (1791), available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1790a.zip, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/PJK3-5VJN. 
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that permitted Senators from the smallest states to expand their already-
extraordinary power by rendering the Senate even more anti-republican in 
character. In other words, the delegates would never have tolerated, for exam-
ple, giving Senators authority to install by majority vote a 66% supermajority 
bill-voting rule, thus empowering the five smallest states, representing only 
15% of the population, to flout the will of the majority.106 
The Federalist—the great document of the ratification debates—confirms 
that the Constitution prohibits supermajority voting requirements, including 
such requirements imposed by the House and Senate on themselves. Writing 
under the pen name “Publius,” Alexander Hamilton and James Madison laid 
out the key points. In Federalist No. 58, Madison trained his gaze directly on 
rules that require “in particular cases, if not in all, more than a majority of a 
quorum for a decision.”107 He acknowledged that these rules might supply 
“some advantages” by posing “another obstacle” to the adoption of “hasty and 
partial measures.”108 Nonetheless, he concluded that “these considerations are 
outweighed by the inconveniences in the opposite scale.”109 Of particular sig-
nificance, supermajority voting rules would invite “an interested minority [to] 
take advantage of [such rules] to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to 
the general weal or . . . to extort unreasonable indulgences.”110 In addition, 
Madison noted that, “[i]n all cases where justice or the general good might re-
quire new laws to be passed or active measures to be pursued, the fundamental 
principle of free government would be reversed. It would no longer be the ma-
jority that would rule; the power would be transferred to the minority.”111 
In Federalist No. 22, Hamilton decried supermajority voting requirements 
as “poison.”112 When operating under them, he explained, the government “is 
often, by the impracticability of obtaining the concurrence of the necessary 
number of votes, kept in a state of inaction,” such that “[i]ts situation must al-
ways savour of weakness—sometimes border on anarchy.”113 Then-recent ex-
perience under the Articles revealed “how much good may be prevented, and 
how much ill may be produced, by the power . . . of keeping affairs in the same 
unfavorable posture in which they may happen to stand at particular peri-
ods.”114 At best, according to Hamilton, supermajority voting rules created 
                                                                                                                           
 106 Subtracting the populations of New Jersey and Connecticut from the figures set forth above, 
the five smallest States consisted of 455,076 persons—that is, 14.6% of the total population. Id.; see 
supra note 105. 
 107 THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, supra note 70, at 396 (James Madison). 
 108 Id. at 396–97. 
 109 Id. at 397. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 70, at 140 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 113 Id. at 141. 
 114 Id. 
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“continual negotiation and intrigue,” as well as “contemptible compromises of 
the public good.”115 At worst, these rules subjected “the regular deliberations 
and decisions of a respectable majority” to the “caprice or artifices of an insig-
nificant, turbulent or corrupt junto.”116 In language of both immediate and pro-
phetic importance, Hamilton observed: “If a pertinacious minority can controul 
the opinion of a majority respecting the best mode of conducting [the public 
business,] the majority in order that something may be done, must conform to 
the views of the minority; and thus the sense of the smaller number will over-
rule that of the greater . . . .”117 
These ideas—and the bedrock principle of majority rule they reflect—
leave no room for supermajority requirements in voting on laws or confirming 
nominees. To be sure, proponents of the Any-Voting-Number Theory have 
suggested that The Federalist undermines the imposition of supermajority vot-
ing rules only by way of the Constitution itself, and not by way of internal 
rulemaking within the House or Senate.118 This reading of Publius, however, 
honors neither the letter nor the spirit of the essays. Federalist No. 75, for ex-
ample, found fault with “all provisions which require more than the majority of 
any body to its resolutions.”119 Federalist No. 58 spoke of the risks of super-
majority voting rules “[i]n all cases where justice or the general good might 
require new laws to be passed.”120 And Federalist No. 54 assured the ratifying 
community that “[u]nder the proposed Constitution, the federal acts . . . will 
depend merely on the majority of votes in the Federal Legislature . . . .”121 Put 
simply, a need to deal with formal rule-based requirements of sixty (or sixty-
seven or seventy-five or one hundred) votes to pass a law in the Senate does 
not square with a system under which the fate of “federal acts . . . will depend 
merely on the majority of votes.”122 
All of these elements of our founding history—from then-prevailing prac-
tices to core republican understandings to excoriation of the Articles’ superma-
jority-voting requirements to the principles of the Great Compromise to the 
pronouncements of Publius—stand against the Any-Voting-Number Theory.123 
                                                                                                                           
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 140. 
 117 Id. at 141. 
 118 See McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 9, at 490 (contending that The Federalist was “ex-
plaining why the Framers did not establish a constitutional supermajority requirement,” which is a 
separate issue from “the validity of a legislative supermajority requirement”). 
 119 THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 70, at 507 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 120 THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, supra note 70, at 397 (James Madison). 
 121 THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, supra note 70, at 371 (James Madison). 
 122 Id. (emphasis added). 
 123 Accord, e.g., BINDER & SMITH, supra note 3, at 33 (“The records of the convention and the 
arguments in the Federalist Papers give no indication that the framers either anticipated or desired 
procedural protection for Senate minorities.”); id. at 51 (“There is no evidence that supermajorities 
were envisioned by the framers nor demanded by the first senators in order to the ensure that the Sen-
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It simply will not work to argue that the Constitution authorizes the modern 
cloture system because the Senate can impose supermajority voting rules on 
itself. In fact, as the Supreme Court recognized in Ballin, constitutional text 
and history—and the deep majoritarian values they still support today—
demonstrate just the opposite.124 
III. THE JUST-A-DEBATING-RULE THEORY 
The foregoing discussion shines a light on a cardinal principle: Our Con-
stitution prohibits supermajority voting requirements for the enactment of leg-
islation and the confirmation of presidential nominees. For purposes of this 
principle, does today’s version of the Senate Cloture Rule embody such a su-
permajority voting requirement? This Part shows why the answer to this ques-
tion is yes. 
Defending this claim involves advancing three propositions. First, the 
Senate’s use of its Cloture Rule has experienced such a radical metamorphosis 
that it now operates in practical effect as a supermajority vote rule for Senate 
action, as opposed to a rule that merely concerns debate.125 Second, because it 
is the practical operation of the Cloture Rule that must determine its constitu-
tional status, the Rule is unconstitutional as it operates today.126 Finally, any 
effort to salvage the Cloture Rule based on its historical justifications fails be-
cause of the dramatically altered way in which the Rule now functions.127 In 
short, the Just-a-Debating-Rule Theory cannot sustain Rule XXII because it no 
longer is just a debating rule. Instead, because the Rule has come to operate in 
practical effect as a supermajority voting requirement, it offends the founda-
tional principle—just established in Part II—that places precisely such re-
quirements beyond the constitutional pale. 
A. The Evolution of the Cloture Rule—From Rule of Debate  
to Rule of Decision 
The discussion that follows shows that the Senate’s system of filibuster 
control has morphed over time into a system of de facto supermajority voting. 
                                                                                                                           
ate could temper immoderate legislation passed by the House. In fact, the available evidence concern-
ing the framers’ views strongly suggests just the opposite.”); Ackerman et al., supra note 13, at 1540 
(noting that the Framers’ rejection of supermajority voting rules “was neither casual nor peripheral to 
their larger design,” but, “[i]nstead, it was based on practical experience and careful consideration of 
the arguments on both sides”); Delker, supra note 22, at 349 (noting how the records of the Conven-
tion show the Framers’ wariness of minority obstructionism and their rejection of broad supermajority 
requirements). 
 124 See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
 125 See infra notes 128–193 and accompanying text. 
 126 See infra notes 194–231 and accompanying text. 
 127 See infra notes 232–271 and accompanying text. 
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This discussion comprises two sections, which focus on how Rule XXII has 
come to work in recent years. Subsection 1 places the current filibuster regime 
in historical context, highlighting how the modern “stealth filibuster” system 
came to displace the long-time use of the cloture mechanism to control actual, 
dilatory speechmaking.128 Subsection 2 goes on to document the consensus 
understanding among knowledgeable observers—whether from academia, the 
media, or the Senate itself—that Rule XXII now operates in practical terms as 
a supermajority voting rule.129 
1. The History of Filibuster Control 
The Senate’s treatment of filibusters has traveled a long and winding 
road.130 Others have laid out this history at length, and there is no need to re-
count the details here.131 To see why present-day practice raises insuperable 
constitutional difficulties, however, it is necessary to highlight key develop-
ments.  
First, the earliest Senates permitted a majority of members to halt debate 
on any pending matter pursuant to what was called the “Previous Question 
Rule.”132 Some critics of Rule XXII’s broad allowance of minority obstruction 
have relied on this history.133 According to their argument, this early endorse-
ment of majority-based cloture signals that supermajority voting requirements 
were and are at odds with the views of the leaders who drafted and ratified the 
Constitution.134 One response to this argument is that the Previous Question 
                                                                                                                           
 128 See infra notes 130–165 and accompanying text. 
 129 See infra notes 166–193 and accompanying text. 
 130 See, e.g., Chafetz, supra note 5, at 1007 (noting that “filibustering has varied dramatically in 
its tactics, its frequency, and its efficacy throughout the history of the United States”). 
 131 E.g., id. at 1023–28 (describing the history of the filibuster); Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 
5, at 185–213 (same); Martin B. Gold & Dimple Gupta, The Constitutional Option to Change Senate 
Rules and Procedures: A Majoritarian Means to Overcome the Filibuster, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 205, 213–260 (2004) (same). 
 132 See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 188 (“The earliest cloture device, which was also 
employed by the Continental Congress and the English Parliament . . . was a motion for the previous 
question. The previous question is a nondebatable motion that, if favored by a majority, closes debate 
and forces an immediate vote on a matter.”); Gold & Gupta, supra note 131, at 214 (confirming that 
the previous question procedure “was a well-entrenched tradition among legislatures of the time,” 
including “the House of Representatives, which still observes it to this day”). In addition, Thomas 
Jefferson’s Manual of Parliamentary Practice, which was “adopted formally in the House and infor-
mally in the Senate in the early Congresses,” Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 188–89, expressly 
stated that “[n]o one is to speak impertinently or beside the question, superfluously, or tediously.” 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE § XVII (1812), reprinted in H.R. 
DOC. NO. 108-241, at 176 (2005). The rules adopted by the first Senate further provided that the pre-
siding officer could call a member to order, at which point the member “shall sit down.” S. JOURNAL, 
1st Cong., 1st Sess. 12, 13 (1789). 
 133 See, e.g., BINDER & SMITH, supra note 3, at 33–37; Bondurant, supra note 20, at 470–73. 
 134 See Bondurant, supra note 20, at 472–73. 
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Rule may evidence only what Framing-era congresses felt they could do—not 
what they had to do—when it came to limiting debate. But, at a minimum, one 
thing is clear: The actions of the senatorial bodies most familiar with the Con-
stitution’s original meaning provide no affirmative support for the idea that 
debate on pending matters—far less the taking of final actions—can be made 
subject to supermajority, as opposed to majority, control.135 
Second, the Senate abandoned the Previous Question Rule in 1806 on the 
ground that no need for it existed,136 opting instead for a system that in effect 
required unanimous consent to end debate on pending matters.137 This system 
created a theoretical possibility that small numbers of dissenters could block 
votes on bills or nominees by engaging in protracted oratory. Just as reformers 
had supposed, however, this problem did not arise in the wake of the 1806 re-
form. Indeed, no known use of the filibuster device occurred in the Senate for 
three decades.138 And senators utilitized speech-based delays only in excep-
tional cases for the remainder of the nineteenth century.139 
                                                                                                                           
 135 The importance of early congressional practice is well-established. See, e.g., Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969) (noting that “precedential value” of congressional actions 
“tends to increase in proportion to their proximity to the Convention of 1787”); Wisconsin v. Pelican 
Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 (1888) (reasoning that an act which “was passed by the first Congress 
assembled under the Constitution, many of whose members had taken part in framing that instrument, 
. . . is contemporaneous and weighty evidence of its true meaning”). 
 136 See Chafetz, supra note 5, at 1023 (noting that the abolition of the previous question motion 
“was motivated not by a desire to eliminate restrictions on debate, but rather because of ‘the belief that 
the rule’s infrequent use made it unnecessary’” (quoting Richard R. Beeman, Unlimited Debate in the 
Senate: The First Phase, 83 POL. SCI. Q. 419, 421 (1968))); see also GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SEN-
ATE OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND PRACTICE 393–94 (1960) (noting that Vice President 
Aaron Burr regarded the previous question rule as unnecessary and recommended discarding it). As a 
result, in making “the rule change in 1806 that made possible the filibuster . . . by eliminating the 
Senate’s previous question rule . . . members of the original Senate expressed no commitment to a 
right of extended debate.” BINDER & SMITH, supra note 3, at 33–34; accord, e.g., Examining the Fili-
buster: The Filibuster Today and Its Consequences: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 
111th Cong. 193 (2010) (statement of Norman J. Ornstein, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research) (contending that “unlimited debate in the Senate was . . . a histor-
ical accident, not an objective of the Framers”). 
 137 See Fisk & Chemerisnky, supra note 5, at 188–95 (discussing the development in the early 
Senate of a “right of unlimited debate”). 
 138 See AMAR, supra note 82, at 365 (noting that “the history of the Senate prior to the 1830s 
offers no notable examples of organized and obstructionist filibustering”); GREGORY KOGER, FILI-
BUSTERING: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF OBSTRUCTION IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE 62 (2010) (identi-
fying the first filibuster in 1831 and its more prominent second occurrence in 1841); see also RICH-
ARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FILIBUSTERS IN THE SENATE, 1789–1993, at 6–19 (1994) 
(setting out in detail filibusters between 1841 and 1993). 
 139 See Chafetz, supra note 5, at 1026 (noting that “[filibusters] remained relatively rare through-
out the nineteenth century” and “for most of this time, the absence of formal limits on Senate debate 
did not operate as a standing minority veto”); Klein, supra note 1, at 26 (noting that in this period 
“minorities used the filibuster more to annoy the majority than to block its agenda”); see also Fisk & 
Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 195 (noting that “almost every filibustered measure before 1880 was 
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Third, with greater frequency, Senators used speech-based filibusters to 
impede the enactment of proposed legislation in the early twentieth century.140 
Even during this period, however, these maneuvers took place only in unusual 
circumstances.141 In particular, during most of the twentieth century, filibusters 
focused on civil rights bills, which were bitterly denounced by southern segre-
gationists.142 Notably, even such targeted use of obstructionist speechmaking 
triggered ameliorative reforms, including the Senate’s replacement in 1917 of 
its unanimous-consent policy with a rule that authorized cloture by a vote of 
two-thirds of the members in attendance.143 To be sure, no reform went so far 
as to ban long-winded oratory altogether or to permit the halt of speechmaking 
by simple majority vote.144 Nonetheless, the threat and reality of extended 
floor-holding by dissident members continued to have only a minor effect on 
the chamber’s day-to-day work through most of the twentieth century.145 
Fourth, the high water mark of obstructionist speechifying came when 
southern Senators occupied the floor for seventy-four days in an effort to block 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.146 This effort, together with follow-up 
filibustering on other civil rights measures, stirred criticism of the Senate,147 
which triggered a series of reforms. Of particular importance, in 1975 the Sen-
                                                                                                                           
eventually passed”). See generally KOGER, supra note 138, at 60 fig.4.3 (charting successful and un-
successful Senate filibusters between 1790 and 1900). 
 140 See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 195 (noting the rise of filibusters in the early twen-
tieth century to the point they came to be seen as “a serious problem”). 
 141 See Harkin, supra note 4, at 72 (“Historically, the filibuster was an extraordinary tool used only 
in the rarest of instances.”); Norman J. Ornstein, Why the Senate No Longer Works, AMERICAN, Mar.-
Apr. 2008, at 74, 76–77, available at http://www.american.com/archive/2008/march-april-magazine-
contents/our-broken-senate, archived at http://perma.cc/43UU-VGY7 (noting the historical understand-
ing that filibusters were “reserved for issues of great national importance”). 
 142 See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 199 (“During a forty year period from the late 1920s 
until the late 1960s, the filibuster became almost entirely associated with the battle over civil rights.”); 
accord, e.g., Chafetz, supra note 5, at 1027 (noting that “for the most part, [the filibuster] was re-
served specifically for civil rights bills”). 
 143 See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 196–99. 
 144 See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 3, at 79 (detailing failed efforts in 1917 to create a simple 
majority cloture rule and identifying the two-thirds cloture rule as a compromise between the two 
parties). 
 145 See, e.g., Gerard N. Magliocca, Reforming the Filibuster, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 303, 312 (2011) 
(indicating that, even after the Senate installed its supermajority cloture procedure, there was “little 
. . . change [in] the Senate’s culture” for most of the twentieth century, except that “an exception 
emerged to the premise that the majority should prevail on the floor for civil rights legislation”); Sen-
ate Action on Cloture Motions, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/
cloture_motions/clotureCounts.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/WAP2-22JV (last visited Jan. 5, 
2014) (providing details about cloture motions, votes, and results from 1917 to present). 
 146 See CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 124–217 (1985). 
 147 See Chafetz, supra note 5, at 1027 (noting that in subsequent sessions “Southern Senators 
mounted filibusters against the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the 1968 Fair Housing Act, the 1970 Voting 
Rights Act reauthorization, and the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act”). 
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ate adopted its current rule, which requires sixty votes to end debate, regard-
less of the number of Senators present.148 In addition, during this same time 
frame, the chamber embraced a “two-track” system for conducting its work.149 
This system created an environment in which delays in acting on one matter 
would not block the Senate from moving forward with other business, thus 
greatly reducing incentives to avoid filibusters that otherwise could grind the 
entire work of the chamber to a halt.150 
Fifth, and finally, this new approach gave rise to the “stealth filibuster” 
system that now exerts a pervasive effect on Senate operations.151 Under this 
system, dissenting minorities no longer need to speak to block legislative ac-
tions.152 Rather, communication to the Senate leadership of minority opposi-
                                                                                                                           
 148 See S. COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., 112TH CONG., SENATE CLOTURE RULE: LIMITATION OF 
DEBATE IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF 
RULE XXII OF THE STANDING RULES OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE (CLOTURE RULE) 29–31, 208 
(Comm. Print 2011). See generally Chafetz, supra note 5, at 1027–28 (noting that after the adoption 
of the 1975 Cloture Rule “the filibuster began to turn into the sixty-vote requirement that we know 
today”). 
 149 See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 3, at 15; Chafetz, supra note 5, at 1010; Fisk & Chemerin-
sky, supra note 5, at 201 (noting that “in response to repeated civil rights filibusters, Senate Majority 
Leader Mike Mansfield developed a system whereby the Senate would spend the morning on the 
filibustered legislation and the afternoon on other business”). 
 150 See Fisk & Chemerinsky supra note 5, at 201 (observing that “the two-track system [aided] a 
filibustering minority, by reducing the amount of time [it had to] hold the floor”); Tonja Jacobi & Jeff 
VanDam, The Filibuster and Reconciliation: The Future of Majoritarian Lawmaking in the U.S. Sen-
ate, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 261, 276 (2013) (describing the development of the two-track system, 
which “spurred the ‘stealth’ or ‘silent’ filibuster”). 
 151 The term “stealth filibuster,” which I use here, came to my attention by way of Professors Fisk 
and Chemerinsky. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 181. For a discussion of the emergence of 
that system, see, for example, RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., WHAT WE DON’T KNOW 
ABOUT FILIBUSTERS 18 (1995) (describing, among other things, Senator Mike Mansfield’s introduc-
tion of the modern “two-track” system). See also Chafetz, supra note 5, at 1010 (noting that “[t]he 
effect of the tracking system is that a filibuster no longer ties up the business of the Senate,” so that 
“[o]nce a Senator announces an intention to filibuster a measure, the issue is simply kept on the back 
burner unless the majority can muster the sixty votes for cloture”; adding that “[t]he tracking sys-
tem—or, more generally, the unwillingness of the Senate majority to use attrition as a means of break-
ing filibusters—has enabled the filibuster to become regularized”). See generally id. at 1027–28 (de-
tailing the transformation of the filibuster into a “sixty-vote requirement” after 1975). 
 152 See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Burying the “Continuing Body” Theory of the Senate, 95 IOWA 
L. REV. 1401, 1418 n.63 (2010) (“Today’s filibusters typically do not feature actual extended debate; 
rather, mere threats to use up the Senate’s valuable time are sufficient to block action.”); Fisk & 
Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 203 (noting that “[t]he stealth filibuster is easier, both physically and 
politically, because it does not require a senator to hold the floor continuously” and that, “[i]n contrast 
to the dilatory tactics of the past, modern filibusters virtually never involve long speeches, all-night 
sessions, or the parliamentary maneuvering that used to draw public attention”); Magliocca, supra 
note 145, at 315 (“Just a credible threat to vote against cloture stifles the exchange of ideas by ensur-
ing in most cases that a contested bill or nomination will not be debated on the floor.”); Jeanne Sha-
heen, Gridlock Rules: Why We Need Filibuster Reform in the U.S. Senate, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 
10 (2013) (noting that filibustering does not “require a senator to sacrifice his or her time in the way it 
once did” because “the fact is that a senator no longer needs to be on the floor to maintain a filibus-
ter”); see also Shaheen, supra, at 11 (observing that while “[b]locking passage of a bill with a filibus-
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tion often results in a decision not even to bring an otherwise properly calen-
dared matter to the floor.153 In addition, when a minority of at least forty-one 
Senators opposes a matter that is brought forward, cloture votes almost always 
occur in a way that has nothing to do with debate.154 Instead, a Senator often 
makes a cloture motion immediately upon presentation of the matter before 
anyone speaks at all.155 Then, when the cloture vote fails, no speechmaking by 
objectors ensues because the Senate simply moves on to its next item of busi-
ness.156 One effect of these changes is that the use of Rule XXII to block action 
by Senate majorities has soared to unprecedented heights in recent years—
indeed, to dizzying heights.157 As a result, “almost all significant legislation” 
                                                                                                                           
ter used to be rare and generally only used for controversial legislation, such as civil rights legisla-
tion,” today even “non-controversial bills . . . routinely face filibusters”). 
 153 See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Senate: Out of Order?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1041, 1055 (2011) 
(“Today, most filibusters do not include extended debate; instead, a Senator ‘filibusters’ a measure 
merely by threatening to engage in time-consuming debate, which is usually sufficient to persuade the 
majority to abandon the measure . . . .”); Chafetz, supra note 5, at 1010–11 (noting that “[t]he effect of 
the tracking system is that a filibuster no longer ties up the business of the Senate” and that “[o]nce a 
Senator announces an intention to filibuster a measure, the issue is simply kept on the back burner 
unless the majority can muster the sixty votes for cloture”; and adding that “this state of affairs has 
been thoroughly internalized by Senators,” so that “a measure that cannot command the support of 
sixty Senators is unlikely even to be introduced onto the Senate floor”); Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra 
note 5, at 203 (“A credible threat that forty-one Senators will refuse to vote for cloture . . . is enough 
to keep a bill off the floor. The Senate leadership simply delays consideration of a bill until it has the 
sixty votes necessary for cloture.”); id. at 216 (“[I]t is clear that the Senate perceives the filibuster to 
be such a significant feature of the Senate’s practice that the leadership is unwilling to proceed on any 
legislation that does not enjoy strong support.”); Harkin, supra note 4, at 68 n.10 (observing that ef-
fective filibusters “take place without any attempt at cloture” voting and “exist by mere threat”); Barry 
Friedman & Andrew D. Martin, Op-Ed., A One-Track Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010, at A27 
(“Today a ‘filibuster’ consists of merely telling the leadership that 41 senators won’t vote for a bill”); 
Jeff Merkley, Memo: The Talking Filibuster, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 12, 2012, 5:34 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/12/jeff-merkley-filibuster-reform_n_2287831.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8ATK-3QY2 (noting that, because of the filibuster threat, “[n]umerous important 
policy bills developed in committees to address major issues facing America never make it to the 
Senate floor for debate”). 
 154 Chafetz, supra note 5, at 1011 (noting that it is “pellucidly clear” that “the filibuster as prac-
ticed today has almost nothing to do with debating an issue”); Gregory Koger & Sergio J. Campos, 
The Conventional Option, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 6) (“In the modern 
Senate, almost all filibusters consist of threats to filibuster. Senators rarely occupy the floor of the 
Senate for an active filibuster . . . .”). 
 155 See supra notes 151–154 and accompanying text. 
 156 See Jacobi & VanDam, supra note 150, at 276 (“[T]he shift in emphasis [beginning in the 
1970s] from attempting to wait out filibusters to forcing immediate votes on them meant that actual 
filibusters no longer had to occur.”); Shaheen, supra note 152, at 7 (“It has become common for the 
majority leader to file cloture on motions to proceed preemptively . . . .”); Olympia Snowe, The Effect 
of Modern Partisanship on Legislative Effectiveness in the 112th Congress, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 21, 
30 (2013) (noting the ability of the Majority Leader to “file a cloture motion as soon as he brings 
legislation to the floor, before any discussion occurs”); see also infra notes 300–311 accompanying 
text (discussing the resulting proposals to reinstate the “talking filibuster”). 
 157 See AMAR, supra note 82, at 365 (“In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, routine 
filibustering practices have sky-rocketed.”); Jacqueline Calmes, “Trivialized” Filibuster Is Still a Potent 
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now needs the support of sixty Senators to secure approval in the upper cham-
ber.158 
                                                                                                                           
Tool, 45 CQ WKLY. 2115, 2115 (1987) (“Once reserved for the most bitter battles of historic dimen-
sion—slavery, war, civil rights—the filibuster has evolved into a tactic so routine that one senator . . . 
says, ‘It’s been trivialized.’”); Benjamin Eidelson, The Majoritarian Filibuster, 122 YALE L.J. 980, 989 
(2013) (explaining why a “shift in incentives” triggered an “explosion of cloture votes since the 1970s,” 
so that now “the filibuster has become routine”; adding that, “[i]n the five decades from 1921 to 1970, a 
total of 47 cloture votes were held,” whereas “112 cloture votes were held in the subsequent decade 
alone” and that “[t]his trend has only accelerated in recent years: more than 300 cloture votes were held 
between 2001 and 2010”); Hatch, supra note 3, at 821–24 (describing then-recent filibusters on judicial 
nominees as “unprecedented” and collecting data in support of that claim); Jacobi & VanDam, supra 
note 150, at 265–66 (“The number of filibusters has reached record levels during the Obama Admin-
istration. The filibuster itself has come to define a new status quo for congressional action . . . .”); id. 
at 275, 288 n.132 (noting that, before the 1960s, “majorities regularly passed legislation . . . ; it had 
simply not come to pass yet that every bill had the threat of a filibuster hanging over it, as is the case 
today, and thus every bill did not have to acquire 60 votes to pass.”); George Packer, The Empty 
Chamber, NEW YORKER, Aug. 9, 2010, at 38, 45 (“The number of filibusters shot up in the eighties and 
continued to rise in the following decades, as the parties kept alternating control of the Senate and esca-
lating a procedural arms race, routinely blocking the confirmation of executive and judicial appointees.”); 
All Things Considered: Former Senate Staffer Laments Rise in Use of Cloture, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 
2, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=123287741, archived at http://
perma.cc/9MMS-NNRC (statement of Ira Shapiro) (describing “fundamental change” in the extent of 
filibustering because “[t]here has been a large spike in cloture votes” and “[t]hey are much higher since 
2006 than they had ever been before, and by orders of magnitude higher”); Sarah Binder, Three Reforms 
to Unstick the Senate, CNN OPINION (Nov. 29, 2012, 10:14 AM), http://cnn.com/2012/11/29/
opinion/binder-filibuster, archived at http://perma.cc/4EEW-WFUL (noting Majority Leader Trent 
Lott’s observation in the late 1990s that “[w]e are locked in a rolling filibuster on every issue, which is 
totally gridlocking the United States Senate,” and adding that filibuster efforts since 2007 have set a 
“historic record”); Robert Byrd, The Filibuster and Its Consequences, THE HILL’S CONG. BLOG (May 
19, 2010, 1:28 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/lawmaker-news/98681-the-filibuster-and-its-
consequences-sen-robert-byrd, archived at http://perma.cc/4TJ5-KD6V (asserting that “[d]uring this 
111th Congress . . . the minority has threatened to filibuster almost every matter proposed for Senate 
consideration” in a time when “just a whisper of opposition brings the ‘world’s greatest deliberative 
body’ to a grinding halt”). For one collection of numerical data that reveals a sharp spike in cloture mo-
tions in recent congressional sessions, see Ezra Klein, Notes on Whether American Democracy Is Work-
ing, WASH. POST, WONKBLOG (Feb. 6, 2013, 1:41 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
wonkblog/wp/2013/02/06/notes-on-whether-american-democracy-is-working/, archived at http://perma.
cc/WRD5-3BEQ; see also Barbara Sinclair, The New World of U.S. Senators, in CONGRESS RECONSID-
ERED 1, 7 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 9th ed. 2009) (charting filibuster and clo-
ture votes from 1951 to 2008); Barbara Sinclair, The “60-Vote Senate”: Strategies, Process, and Out-
comes, in U.S. SENATE EXCEPTIONALISM 241, 243 (Bruce I. Oppenheimer ed., 2002) (“In the 1950s, 
filibusters were rare; they increased during the 1960s and again during the 1970s. By the late 1980s and 
the 1990s, they had become routine . . . .”). Notably, the leading commentators who associate themselves 
with defending the filibuster regime acknowledge that there has been an “explosive increase . . . in the 
use of the filibuster” over the past three decades. ARENBERG & DOVE, supra note 3, at 17, 31, 48 (de-
scribing the “meteoric rise” of the filibuster and noting that its use “has greatly accelerated”). 
 158 Chafetz, supra note 5, at 1009–10 (collecting data that shows that “cloture has simply become 
another standard procedural hurdle that almost all significant legislation must clear”); accord, e.g., 
Eidelson, supra note 157, at 989–90 (noting that historically “the filibuster was understood as a corol-
lary of a senator’s prerogative to debate,” but that this “understanding of the filibuster has eroded 
along with its procedural foundations”; adding that “[i]ncreasingly, the filibuster has come to be un-
derstood as a simple supermajority rule for passing legislation or confirming nominees”); Jacobi & 
2014] The Filibuster and the Framing 63 
It is important not to oversimplify how modern filibusters work. To begin 
with, as we have seen, formal filibuster-control decisions often are not made at 
the stage of the legislative process when the Senate gives final consideration to 
bills.159 Rather, they can and do occur at earlier stages, often in the context of 
handling the “motion to proceed,” which determines whether the Senate will 
take up a matter at all.160 In addition, minority blocs have been able to exert 
pressure at different stages of the legislative process,161 including when they 
lack the forty-one votes needed to resist cloture efforts. This is so because even 
a demand for a cloture vote that is likely to produce sixty supporters can chew 
up the Senate’s working time,162 which has become increasingly scarce as the 
                                                                                                                           
VanDam, supra note 150, at 268 (describing the reconciliation exception as providing “majorities in 
the Senate . . . an opportunity, albeit a limited one, to assert themselves over the prevailing minority 
powers”); Koger & Campos, supra note 154 (manuscript at 3) (“The filibuster is no longer the sel-
dom-used procedure romanticized in movies like Mr. Smith Goes to Washington. It now imposes a de 
facto supermajority vote requirement to pass any legislation in the Senate.”). To be sure, there exists a 
“reconciliation” exception to the filibuster rule that concerns matters related to federal budget. See 2 
U.S.C. § 641(e)(2) (2012). But the effect of this exception is limited because “a significant portion of 
the Senate’s business cannot be shoehorned into the budget category, even through creative drafting.” 
Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 216. 
 159 See supra notes 151–156 and accompanying text. 
 160 See Tom Udall, The Constitutional Option: Reforming Rules of the Senate to Restore Ac-
countability and Reduce Gridlock, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 115, 119 (2011) (noting that “minority 
of senators can use the filibuster to actually prevent debate because a motion to proceed to the consid-
eration of a measure is itself a debatable question”). Further complicating matters is the fact that from 
time to time the Senate tweaks its cloture practice. In January 2013, for example, the Senate made 
changes as to handling motions to proceed, formation of conference committees, and confirmations of 
district court judges. See ELIZABETH RYBICKI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42996, CHANGES TO SEN-
ATE PROCEDURES IN THE 113TH CONGRESS AFFECTING THE OPERATION OF CLOTURE (S.RES. 15 AND 
S.RES. 16) 19 (2013). As many others have emphasized, however, these reforms, which apply only to 
the 113th Congress, were of limited significance. Senators Strike a Deal on Filibusters, Averting ‘Nu-
clear Option’ Showdown, PBS NEWSHOUR (July 16, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/
july-dec13/filibuster_07-16.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5DBY-8WHT (statement of Senator Jeff 
Merkley); see Ryan Grim et al., Harry Reid, Mitch McConnell Reach Filibuster Reform Deal [Up-
date], HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 24, 2013, 11:43 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/24/
harry-reid-mitch-mcconnell-filibuster_n_2541356.html, archived at http://perma.cc/B5GY-NP99 
(quoting CREDO’s Political Director, Becky Bond, as stating that “[t]he bipartisan deal . . . will do 
next to nothing to actually fix the filibuster,” and quoting a representative of the group “Fix the Senate 
Now” as summing up the agreement as one that avoids “measures that would actually raise the costs 
of Senate obstruction” and “a missed opportunity to provide meaningful filibuster reform”). 
 161 See, e.g., Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 205 (asserting that “[s]ometimes several clo-
ture motions will be filed on any matter that might be filibustered, including a conference report, a 
motion to proceed, or the bill itself”); Binder, supra note 157 (noting a then-existing opportunity to 
filibuster each of the three motions needed to submit a passed bill to a conference committee). 
 162 See, e.g., Klein, supra note 1, at 27 (describing the great difficulties in getting cloture, and 
explaining how a single bill could be filibustered “some half a dozen times”); id. (explaining that 
“[e]very step of the process can have its own filibuster, with its own two days to vote to break that 
filibuster, and its own thirty hours of post-filibuster debate”); see also Carl W. Tobias, Postpartisan 
Federal Judicial Selection, 51 B.C. L. REV. 769, 780 (2010) (describing the slow process for confir-
mation of judicial nominees in 2009, and noting that, as a result, “even if Democrats had invoked 
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scope of government business has expanded and pressures on Senators to leave 
Washington—typically to raise campaign funds—have intensified.163 Most 
important of all, key on-the-ground decisions about the processing of matters 
within the Senate are routinely made in negotiations between party leaders, 
who effectively determine whether and when to take up discrete proposals, 
how much time to allocate to the handling of such proposals, how amendments 
to such proposals will be processed, and at what stage cloture votes will oc-
cur.164 This largely informal process is marked by subtlety and nuance. But the 
critical point for present purposes involves no subtlety or nuance at all: All of 
these negotiations transpire against the backdrop of a settled understanding 
that “most measures require sixty votes to pass the Senate.”165 
2. Modern Perceptions of Senate Operations 
Based on this history, thoughtful observers of Senate practice agree that 
the body’s treatment of filibusters has undergone “dramatic” change.166 In the 
past, the Senate’s supermajority Cloture Rule operated to permit protracted 
                                                                                                                           
cloture . . . the Republicans would have received thirty hours of debate, thus precluding other nomina-
tions from coming to a vote” prior to recess). 
 163 See, e.g., Packer, supra note 157, at 41 (noting, among other things, that it is now “an unwrit-
ten rule of the modern Senate that votes are almost never scheduled for Mondays or Fridays, which 
allows Senators to spend four days away from the capital,” in part because “[n]othing dominates the 
life of a Senator more than raising money”); Byrd, supra note 157 (bemoaning the current environ-
ment in which “every Senator spends hours every day, throughout the year and every year, raising 
funds for re-election and appearing before cameras and microphones” and in which “the Senate often 
works three-day weeks, with frequent and extended recess periods, so Senators can rush home to 
fundraisers scheduled months in advance”). On the critical role of time pressure in the modern legisla-
tive process, see, for example, Bruce I. Oppenheimer, Changing Time Constraints on Congress: His-
torical Perspectives on the Use of Cloture, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 393, 396, 404 (Lawrence C. 
Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 3d ed. 1985), which describes how “Congress now finds itself in 
an era when it is working under time constraints nearly all the time,” making “the luxury of unlimited 
debate” less affordable and creating “a different incentive structure [that allows] a filibuster or the 
threat of one [to] be usefully employed at any time in a Congress—not just at the end.” See also 
Ornstein, supra note 141, at 78 (advocating, along with filibuster reform, a return to “a much more 
rigorous Senate schedule, ideally five full days a week in session for three consecutive weeks, with 
one week off to attend to constituent needs”). 
 164 See, e.g., Packer, supra note 157, at 41 (emphasizing that “the main business of the [Senate] is 
a continuous negotiation” between the majority and minority leaders because “nearly everything in the 
Senate depends on unanimous consent”). 
 165 Chafetz, supra note 5, at 1040 (observing that “most measures require sixty votes to pass the 
Senate”); Jacobi & VanDam, supra note 150, at 278 (describing present-day Senate as an institution 
“where an invisible filibuster by default hangs over any controversial legislation, and sixty votes are 
needed to remove it ‘in almost every case’”; “in other words . . . minorities reign”). 
 166 Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 200; see, e.g., Harkin, supra note 4, at 73 (finding that 
“[w]hereas forty years ago fewer than ten percent of major bills were subject to a filibuster, in the last 
Congress, seventy percent of major bills were targeted”). 
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speechmaking on the Senate floor and to do so only on an occasional basis.167 
Today, in contrast, it functions as “a substantive supermajority voting rule”168 
in connection with “nearly every measure to come before the Senate,”169 so 
that “sixty votes in the Senate, rather than a simple majority, are necessary to 
pass legislation.”170 
Within the legal academy, both proponents and opponents of modern 
Senate practice have recognized this fundamental shift.171 Professor Josh 
Chafetz, for example, has observed that today’s filibuster system is “qualita-
tively different from . . . the historical practice,”172 so that “cloture has now 
effectively become a requirement for passage of any significant measure.”173 
                                                                                                                           
 167 See, e.g., Chafetz, supra note 5, at 1027 and accompanying text (noting historic reservation of 
filibusters for issues of specialized importance—most notably, civil rights); Magliocca, supra note 
145, at 308 (noting that “until the 1970’s, unlimited debate was mainly a procedural device that pro-
tected free speech, improved the quality of deliberation, and revealed the intensity of preferences in 
the Senate”). See generally supra notes 140–145 and accompanying text (discussing the increased 
frequency of speech-based filibusters in the early twentieth century). 
 168 Magliocca, supra note 145, at 308; accord, e.g., Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 213 
(“[F]ilibustering has in effect created a supermajority requirement for the enactment of most legisla-
tion.”). 
 169 Chafetz, supra note 5, at 1040; accord id. at 1011 (emphasizing that “the filibuster is no long-
er reserved for issues of unusual importance or on which preferences are unusually intense”); Fisk & 
Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 182 (noting that filibusters now apply to almost all matters). 
 170 Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 182; accord Chafetz & Gerhardt, supra note 10, at 249 
(Chafetz) (“As a functional matter, it can now be said that [the filibuster] requires sixty votes to pass a 
piece of legislation in the Senate.”); Chafetz, supra note 5, at 1008, 1010–11 (noting that “[c]loture is 
now a de facto requirement for the passage of any significant measure—and this is a very recent phe-
nomenon,” and adding that most significant legislation must clear the procedural hurdle of cloture, so 
that “[i]n the Senate today, a supermajority of sixty Senators is required to pass a bill”); Magliocca, 
supra note 145, at 304 (noting that there is now a “presumption that a supermajority is required for 
most Senate action”); see also GREGORY J. WAWRO & ERIC SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER: OBSTRUCTION 
AND LAWMAKING IN THE U.S. SENATE 157 (2006) (“In the contemporary Senate . . . it is safe to as-
sume that a 60% majority is generally necessary to adopt major legislation.”). Notably, this view is 
shared by self-identified defenders of the current filibuster system. ARENBERG & DOVE, supra note 3, 
at 28 (acknowledging that “over the last two decades, a frustrated Senate overburdened by filibusters 
has succumbed to accepting a ‘60-vote threshold’ on many controversial bills,” and finding that one 
columnist “put his finger on the crux of the dilemma” in observing that “[a] simple majority vote no 
longer suffices to pass major pieces of legislation”). 
 171 See, e.g., Chafetz & Gerhardt, supra note 10, at 247–49 (making this point); id. at 255 (Ger-
hardt) (not contesting this description); Jacobi & VanDam, supra note 150, at 267 (“The filibuster is a 
creation of Congress that has drifted far from its original moorings, to the point where actual filibus-
ters occur only in the rarest circumstances, and yet 60 votes are required to defeat one.”). Indeed, in 
defending supermajority voting rules at the final voting stage, Professors John McGinnis and Michael 
Rappaport argued that such rules operate in the same way as present-day Rule XXII. See McGinnis & 
Rappaport I, supra note 9, at 497 (“No plausible constitutional distinction exists between the rules that 
have permitted filibusters and the three-fifths rule” concerning tax-rate legislation); id. at 484 (noting 
that the purpose of the filibuster system “has been the same as the three-fifths rule—to frustrate legis-
lative majorities”). 
 172 See Chafetz & Gerhardt, supra note 10, at 259. 
 173 Id. at 247–48; see also id. at 249 (“[T]he filibuster is no longer reserved only for issues of 
unusual importance, nor is it used simply to extend debate on an issue. A senator who intends to vote 
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Professor Aaron-Andrew Bruhl has added, “We now have a ‘sixty-vote Senate’ 
when it comes to almost any mildly controversial measure.”174 And Professor 
Amar has noted that “[t]hanks to an internal Senate rule allowing filibusters—
Senate Rule 22, to be precise—the de facto threshold for enacting a wide range 
of legislation has in recent years become 60 votes . . . .”175 
Political scientists have reached the same conclusion.176 Extended study 
of modern Senate practices led Professors Gregory Wawro and Eric Shickler to 
conclude that “all the players understand that in the absence of a sixty-vote 
coalition, legislation will fail to pass.”177 Norman Ornstein of the American 
Enterprise Institute has observed that “the sharp increase in cloture motions 
reflects the routinized use of the filibuster . . . as a weapon to delay and ob-
struct in nearly all matters.”178 After consulting with experts in the field, Ezra 
Klein reported, “The truth, filibuster scholars say, is that almost everything in 
today’s Senate is effectively filibustered, since at least sixty members have to 
want to let anything move forward for it to do so.”179 
Those who watch the day-to-day operations of the upper chamber—such 
as newspaper, magazine, and broadcast media analysts—agree that the upper 
chamber now operates under “a de facto sixty vote requirement.”180 Both re-
porters and editorialists often have noted this on-the-ground reality.181 Indeed, 
                                                                                                                           
against final passage of a bill need no longer separately justify her decision to vote against cloture.”); 
id. at 259 (“Today, the filibuster operates as a standing requirement that important legislation (outside 
of the budget process) needs sixty votes to pass.”). 
 174 Bruhl, supra note 152, at 1418. 
 175 See AMAR, supra note 82, at 361 (adding that this requirement of sixty votes operates “instead 
of the constitutionally proper 51 votes”). 
 176 See, e.g., KOGER, supra note 138, at 3 (describing “the ability of senators to block bills and 
nominations unless 60 percent of the Senate votes to override a ‘filibuster’”); David R. Mayhew, Su-
permajority Rule in the U.S. Senate, 36 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 31, 31 (2003) (noting that, at least when 
major legislation is at issue, “[a]utomatic failure for bills not reaching the 60 mark . . . is the current 
Senate practice”); Jonathan Bernstein, Reform: The Motion to Proceed, A PLAIN BLOG ABOUT POLI-
TICS (Nov. 27, 2012, 12:27PM), http://plainblogaboutpolitics.blogspot.com/2012/11/reform-motion-
to-proceed.html, archived at http://perma.cc/D7EY-RJP3 (citing “the (de facto) requirement that a bill 
needs 60 to pass,” and adding that “it takes 60 Senators to pass a bill or confirm a nomination”). 
 177 See WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note 170, at 27 (noting that “all the players understand that 
in the absence of a sixty-vote coalition, legislation will fail to pass”). 
 178 See Examining the Filibuster: The Filibuster Today and Its Consequences, supra note 136, at 
193 (statement of Norman J. Ornstein, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research). 
 179 Klein, supra note 1, at 27. 
 180 Susan Liss & Mimi Marziani, The Founding Fathers Would Like Reconciliation, Not the Fili-
buster, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2010/03/23/founding-
fathers-would-like-reconciliation-not-the-filibuster, archived at http://perma.cc/ZJZ5-QWYE (adding 
that “the threat of filibuster is so constant that a supermajority vote of 60 . . . is assumed necessary to 
conduct any Senate business”). See generally infra notes 181–193 and accompanying text (compiling 
sources that make this point). 
 181 E.g., Arthur S. Fleming & Ray Marshall, Op-Ed., Tyranny of the Minority, N.Y. TIMES, May 
30, 1994, at A15 (noting that in the Senate, “majority rule is becoming the exception rather than the 
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working journalists have become so accustomed to the practical operation of 
Rule XXII that they routinely take it as a given that sixty votes are required to 
pass bills in the Senate.182 Other knowledgeable Congress watchers share the 
same view. During oral argument in the health care case, for example, Justice 
Antonin Scalia questioned the suggestion that Congress would be able to re-
spond to a Court ruling that invalidated part of the challenged act while leaving 
                                                                                                                           
rule” and that “[t]oday’s filibuster epidemic means that in effect the Senate needs nearly as many 
votes to pass legislation (60) as it does to override a veto, enact a constitutional amendment or im-
peach a president (67)”); Thomas Geoghegan et al., Editorial, Bring on the Filibuster, NATION, Feb. 
22, 2010, at 3, 3–4, available at http://www.thenation.com/article/bring-filibuster#, archived at http://
perma.cc/3WRB-B9N8 (noting that “[r]ight now, the Senate operates under a supermajority rule that 
the founders never intended and that has no precedent in the way the Senate used to operate”); Thom-
as Geoghegan, Op-Ed., Mr. Smith Rewrites the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2010, at A17 (con-
cluding that “a 60-vote majority is required to . . . pass any contested bill”); Jeremy W. Peters, New 
Senate Rules to Curtail the Excesses of the Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2013, at A1 (noting mi-
norities’ “ability to force a supermajority of 60 votes to advance bills”); Editorial, Reform and the 
Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2011, at A20 (noting the “automatic way the filibuster has been used in 
recent years” and that “[b]y simply raising an anonymous objection, senators can trigger a 60-vote 
supermajority for virtually every piece of legislation”); David E. RePass, Op-Ed., Make My Filibuster, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2009, at A23 (“In recent years . . . the Senate has become so averse to the 
[speech-based] filibuster that if fewer than 60 senators support a controversial measure, it usually 
won’t come up for discussion at all.”); Jonathan Weisman, Filibuster Deal Heralds Stirrings of Com-
promise, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2013, at A13 (reporting that “with a 60-vote threshold in the Senate, 
the minority party tends to rule absolutely on any issue lacking overwhelming bipartisan support” and 
“[t]hat is because only the largest gang can muster 60 votes, and a premium is placed on leadership 
loyalty in the minority party”); Editorial, The Senate’s Abuse of Filibuster Rule Threatens Democracy, 
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 29, 2010, 8:55 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/opinion/ci_
14291035, archived at http://perma.cc/T8LP-4UQ5 (“[A]ny significant legislation will need 60 votes 
in the Senate rather than just a majority.”). 
 182 See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & Ashley Parker, Senate Digs in for Long Battle Over Immigra-
tion Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2013, at A1 (explaining in article on proposed immigration legislation 
that “[i]f all 54 Democratic senators vote for the bill, which is unlikely, supporters would need six 
Republicans to prevent a filibuster and pass the legislation”). The point is exemplified by the reality 
that journalists sometimes draw no distinction at all between votes on cloture and votes on bills. In 
April 2013, for example, the Senate took up a bill on gun-sale background checks that was proposed 
by Senators Joe Manchin and Pat Toomey. As reported by CNN Politics: “[A]ll the amendments con-
sidered Wednesday required 60 votes to pass in the 100-member chamber, meaning Democrats and 
their independent allies who hold 55 seats needed support from some GOP senators to push through 
the Manchin-Toomey proposal.” Ted Barrett & Tom Cohen, Senate Rejects Expanded Gun Back-
ground Checks, CNN POLITICS (Apr. 18, 2013, 11:02 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/17/politics/
senate-guns-vote, archived at http://perma.cc/NQF7-32BZ. The end result was that the proposal failed 
because “[t]he final vote was 54 in favor to 46 opposed” —with Majority Leader Reid providing one 
of the “no” votes solely for technical reasons concerning the possibility of later reconsidering the 
measure. Id. As it turned out, efforts were in fact undertaken to resuscitate a new compromise bill. So 
well understood is the sixty-vote principle, however, that the New York Times reported, in a lengthy 
article published on June 14, that “[a]dvocates of expanded gun background checks need five senators 
to change their votes, and a sixth if . . . newly appointed Republican senator, Jeffrey S. Chiesa, is 
opposed” —without ever pausing to mention that this additional measure of support was needed to 
secure sixty, not fifty-one, votes. Jonathan Weisman, Democrats Quietly Renew Push for Gun 
Measures, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2013, at A17. 
68 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:39 
the rest of it intact.183 The problem, he observed, is that “[y]ou can’t repeal the 
rest of the act because you’re not going to get sixty votes in the Senate to re-
peal the act.”184 
Senators themselves have recognized the radically altered nature of clo-
ture practice in the chamber’s day-to-day work.185 For example, while Demo-
crats controlled the Senate during the late 1990s, Senator Joseph Lieberman 
asserted that “this body, by its rules, has essentially amended the Constitution 
to require sixty-votes to pass any issue on which Members choose to filibuster 
or threaten to filibuster.”186 After Republicans recaptured a majority of Senate 
seats, the chamber’s leader, Trent Lott, declared that “to have filibusters on 
Federal judicial nominations” involves “requiring only forty-one votes to de-
feat a judicial nomination.”187 Senator Trent Lott’s successor, Bill Frist, 
reached the same conclusion, describing Senate practice under Rule XXII as 
                                                                                                                           
 183 Transcript of Oral Argument at 73–74, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012) (No. 11-393). 
 184 Id. at 73. 
 185 See, e.g., 159 CONG. REC. S5680 (daily ed. July 15, 2013) (statement of Sen. Jeff Flake) (ob-
serving that “[b]ringing even the most non-controversial resolutions to the Senate floor requires the 
agreement or at least the acquiescence of the minority”); Hatch, supra note 3, at 826 (describing the 
“attempt to use Rule 22’s supermajority requirement for cloture to change the Constitution’s simple 
majority requirement for confirmation”); Udall, supra note 160, at 115, 118, 122 (explaining that 
“[t]he use of obstructionist procedural tactics such as the filibuster . . . has expanded rapidly in recent 
Congresses, to the point where they are now everyday rather than extraordinary occurrences,” that 
“the filibuster no longer serves to extend important debate and improperly shifts control of the legisla-
tive agenda to the minority party,” and that “[t]he modern filibuster is simply a minority veto, a pow-
erful one at that”); Weisman, supra note 181 (noting comments of Senator Mary Landrieu that “now 
the only people who are empowered are the obstructionists” and that “for the rest of us, the power we 
should be wielding on behalf of our constituents is virtually nil”). By way of example, in the midst of 
recent tensions caused by efforts to raise the debt ceiling, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell 
declared: “[L]et me say that this is almost an out-of-body experience to have someone suggest a 50-
vote threshold on a matter of this magnitude . . . .” 157 CONG. REC. S5062 (daily ed. July 29, 2011) 
(statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell); see also Klein, supra note 1, at 24–25 (noting Senator 
McConnell’s statement that “[m]atters of this level of controversy always require sixty votes,” as well 
as Vice President Joe Biden’s observation that recent terms of Congress constitute “the first time eve-
ry single solitary decision has required sixty senators”). Notably, House members—including present-
day Republicans—also recognize that “while the main rule in the House is ‘whoever has 218 votes 
wins,’ the rule in the Senate is different: ‘There’s nothing you can do without 60 votes.’” Basic Train-
ing: Senate Rules from a House Perspective, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON RULES—
REPUBLICANS, http://rules-republicans.house.gov/Educational/Read.aspx?ID=8, archived at http://
perma.cc/5B7V-ZYHY (last visited Jan. 5, 2014). 
 186 141 CONG. REC. 38 (1995) (statements of Sen. Joe Lieberman); see also 140 CONG. REC. 3459 
(1994) (statement of Sen. Tom Harkin) (making the same point and arguing, on that basis, that the 
Senate filibuster regime had become unconstitutional). 
 187 145 CONG. REC. 21822 (1999) (statement of Sen. Trent Lott); see Cornyn, supra note 37, at 
194 (condemning recent use of Senate rules “to change the voting rule on judicial nominations from a 
simple majority to 60 votes”); Hatch, supra note 3, at 826 (lamenting that the Cloture Rule is being 
used “to change the Constitution’s simple majority requirement for confirmation”). 
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“nothing less than a formula for tyranny by the minority.”188 After Democrats 
again secured a majority of seats in the Senate, they provided the same—once 
again accurate—accounts of Republican deployments of the modern stealth 
filibuster system.189 In the summer of 2013, for example, Senator Bernie Sand-
ers echoed the now-familiar refrain that “a super-majority of sixty votes is 
needed to pass virtually any piece of legislation.”190 
Given this avalanche of supporting material, it is no surprise that Profes-
sors Fisk and Chemerinsky concluded, even in 1997, that the Senate “has in 
effect created a supermajority requirement for the enactment of most legisla-
tion.”191 Intervening developments leave no doubt that things have moved even 
more sharply in that direction since those words were written.192 As Senator 
Tom Harkin, who now has served in the upper chamber for nearly three dec-
ades, recently observed: “Successive Congresses have ratcheted up the level of 
                                                                                                                           
 188 Senator Bill Frist, Restoring Fairness and Dignity to the Judicial Confirmation Process in the 
United States Senate, Speech at the Heritage Foundation (June 28, 2005) (transcript available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Events/2005/06/restoring-fairness-to-the-judicial-confirmation-process-in-the-
united-states-senate, archived at http://perma.cc/44TR-SZ77). 
 189 E.g., Examining the Filibuster: History of the Filibuster 1789–2010: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Rules & Admin., 111th Cong. 65 (2010) (statement of Robert B. Dove, Parliamentarian Emeri-
tus, U.S. Senate) (quoting Vice President Biden as stating: “Most people would agree that the United 
States has never acted as consistently as they have to require a supermajority, that is 60 votes, to get 
anything done. That’s a fundamental shift.”); Harkin, supra note 4, at 68 (arguing that the filibuster is 
being used “at a level without precedent in the 221-year history of the legislative body”); id. at 75 (“[I]t 
has become accepted that any legislation needs sixty votes to pass the Senate.”); Timothy Noah, Die, 
Filibuster, Die: The Biggest Obstacle to the Obama Agenda, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 6, 2012, at 2, 2 
available at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/magazine/110215/die-filibuster-die, archived 
at http://perma.cc/KKU8-6XUU (observing that, in 2009, “[e]very returning Democratic senator 
signed a letter complaining that Republican routinization of filibusters was imposing a 60-vote super-
majority requirement on nearly all significant bills”). Notably, modern proponents of the filibuster 
mechanism do not seriously contest these characterizations. In recent hearings, for example, Senator 
Lamar Alexander defended modern Senate filibuster practice by observing that over the course of the 
past two years, “we have not had any experience in working across party lines. What the filibuster 
does is say, you are not going to pass anything in the Senate unless at least some Republicans and 
some Democrats agree. You will not pass anything unless you get a consensus.” 157 CONG. REC. S26 
(daily ed. Jan. 5, 2011) (statement of Sen. Lamar Alexander); see also id. (distinguishing the “majori-
tarian House” from the “different” Senate “where we can say, you are not going to pass anything 
unless we do it together” —that is, with “consensus,” and adding that “if bills [that require bicameral 
action] come from the House to the Senate, we in the Senate say, woah, let’s think this over. We do 
not pass it. We do not pass it unless we have some kind of consensus.”). This effort to defend the 
filibuster confirms that the essential effect and purpose of modern Senate practice is to require a “con-
sensus” —that is, sixty votes—to pass bills or confirm nominees. 
 190 Press Release, Sen. Bernie Sanders, Sanders Welcomes Short-Term Filibuster Fix, Says More 
Needed to End Senate Dysfunction (July 16, 2013), available at http://www.sanders.senate.gov/news
room/news/?id=1dfed876-4f90-425a-abff-19be75934c10, archived at http://perma.cc/DC8M-GAAS 
(adding that, for this reason, it is “time for real Senate rules reform”). 
 191 Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 213; see id. at 184 (adding that the “modern filibuster is 
simply a minority veto”). 
 192 See generally supra note 157 (collecting materials on this point). 
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obstructionism to the point where sixty votes have become a de facto require-
ment to pass any legislation.”193  
B. The Constitutional Primacy of Substance over Form 
The preceding discussion leads to one conclusion: “sixty votes have be-
come a de facto requirement” for taking large swaths of action in the upper 
chamber.194 Put another way, “[t]he idea that it is curtailing debate that takes 
sixty votes—and not the ultimate passage of anything—has thus been reduced 
to a legal fiction.”195 All of this raises a question of fundamental importance: 
Under these conditions, can Rule XXII be reconciled with the constitutional 
prohibition on supermajority voting rules in enacting legislation? To ask this 
question is to answer it because “the Constitution is concerned, not with form, 
but with substance.”196 
This principle has deep roots in our law. The Framers recognized its cen-
trality.197 It also found expression in the earliest work of the Supreme Court.198 
Building on this foundation, the Court has endorsed the substance-over-form 
                                                                                                                           
 193 Harkin, supra note 4, at 72. 
 194 Id.; Senator Tom Harkin, Address at the 2010 Living Constitution Lecture at the Brennan 
Center for Justice (June 15, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.harkin.senate.gov/press/release.
cfm?i=325688, archived at http://perma.cc/FZ8C-CK6S). 
 195 Eidelson, supra note 157, at 990 (emphasis removed). 
 196 Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931). 
 197 In The Federalist, for example, Publius vigorously objected to the ineffectual operation of 
state constitutional provisions that had come to serve as only “parchment barriers.” THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 48, supra note 70, at 333 (James Madison). See generally DAN T. COENEN, THE STORY OF THE 
FEDERALIST: HOW HAMILTON AND MADISON RECONCEIVED AMERICA 108 (2007) (discussing 
Founding-era concerns that federal bodies would overstep their constitutional authority). In fact, Pub-
lius’s initial opposition to a federal Bill of Rights was based largely on concerns that, if such a Bill 
were put in place, its provisions would operate in a similarly ineffectual—and thus intolerably coun-
terproductive—way. See COENEN, supra, at 174–76. Over time, however, proponents of ratification—
including the authors of The Federalist—became persuaded that a Bill of Rights could serve its pur-
pose, in part because the independent judiciary created by the Constitution would be capable of re-
sponding to attempted evasions of its commands. See id. at 177–78. 
 198 See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 444 (1827) (upholding a constitutional 
challenge under the Import-Export Clause, despite the structuring of the state tax as one on occupa-
tions because “[i]t is impossible to conceal from ourselves, that this is varying the form, without vary-
ing the substance” of an otherwise impermissible law); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 
174, 178 (1803) (reasoning that judicial review was mandated to ensure that the limits the Constitu-
tion places on congressional action have effect “in practice” and emphasizing, more particularly, that 
“[i]f congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has 
declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction where the constitution has de-
clared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without 
substance”); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) (precluding Con-
gress from enacting otherwise impermissible legislation under the “pretext” of wielding a granted 
power). 
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principle in countless cases.199 Among the jurists who have relied on it are all 
members of the current Court, including—and rightly so200—those Justices 
who gravitate most to the originalist interpretive method.201 
Nor does this principle bear on modern cloture practice in only a loose or 
tenuous way. The Court, for example, has wielded the substance-over-form 
norm to thwart congressional attempts to overreach in exercising textually 
granted powers—just as the preceding discussion suggests the Senate has done 
in invoking the Rules of Proceedings Clause.202 The Court has made clear that 
                                                                                                                           
 199 See, e.g., United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 142 (1980) (“The exaltation of form 
over substance is to be avoided. . . . [I]t is the substance of the action that is controlling, and not the 
label given that action.”); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 27 (1910) 
(“This court has repeatedly adjudged that in all such matters the judiciary will not regard mere forms, 
but will look through forms to the substance of things. Such is an established rule of constitutional 
construction, as the adjudged cases abundantly show.”); Almy v. California, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 169, 
174 (1860) (rejecting a state’s argument for the constitutionality of the challenged law because “a tax 
on a bill of lading, although differing in form from a duty on the article shipped, is in substance the 
same thing”). For one of many applications of the rule, see Village of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 
269, 279 (1898), in which the Court held that a sufficiently severe “exaction from the owner of private 
property of the cost of a public improvement” can amount to a Fifth Amendment taking even if enact-
ed “under the guise of taxation.” 
 200 See supra notes 197–198 and accompanying text. 
 201 See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2599 (2013) (Alito, 
J., joined by Roberts, C.J. and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.) (rejecting dissent’s effort to remove 
fee-based conditions from Takings Clause scrutiny in part because “if we accepted this argument it 
would make it very easy for . . . officials to evade the limitations of Nollan and Dolan” even though 
such fees “are functionally equivalent to other types of land use exactions”); id. at 2608 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Breyer, JJ.) (not questioning majority’s anti-evasion 
principle, but finding it inapplicable because “[n]o one has presented evidence that . . . local officials 
routinely short-circuit Nollan and Dolan”); Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918, 1920 (2013) 
(Breyer, J., joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.) (deeming inconsequential op-
portunity for direct review of ineffective-assistance claims that state law provides “on its face” be-
cause it operates only “theoretically” so that collateral review constitutes the actual review procedure 
“as a practical matter”); City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1870–71 (2013) (Scalia, J., joined 
by Thomas, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.) (focusing on “reality, laid bare,” as opposed to 
“labels” in rejecting purported jurisdiction exception to principle of Chevron deference); Evans v. 
Michigan, 133 S. Ct. 1069, 1076, 1078 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., joined by all Justices except Alito, J.) 
(stating that, in applying constitutional double-jeopardy retrial principles, “we have emphasized that 
labels do not control our analysis” and that instead “the substance of a court’s decision does”; observ-
ing in particular that constitutional rulings do not hinge on whether the trial judge “incanted the word 
‘acquit’”); Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 214 (2004) (Thomas, J., joined by all members 
of the Court) (refusing to “elevate form over substance and allow parties to evade” otherwise control-
ling principles in the preemption context); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 604 (2002) (Ginsberg, J., 
joined by Stevens, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas, JJ.) (reasoning that acceptance of state’s argument 
would reduce a key Sixth Amendment precedent “to a ‘meaningless and formalistic’ rule of statutory 
drafting”). 
 202 See, e.g., Powell, 395 U.S. at 547 (refusing to permit the House to exercise “under the guise” 
of another power that is “essentially that same power” that the Constitution had denied to it). Notably, 
substance-over-form constitutional reasoning took center stage in the Court’s recent decision on 
whether congressional health care reforms exceeded the federal legislative power. See, e.g., Sebelius, 
132 S. Ct. at 2595 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.) (asserting 
that the Court must examine the constitutionality of a purported tax law by “[d]isregarding the desig-
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this principle outlaws putatively “procedural” rules that render substantive 
constitutional restrictions ineffectual—thus foreclosing the convenient wrap-
ping of supermajority voting rules in the verbal garb of debate-cloture re-
strictions.203 Finally, the Court has deployed the substance-over-form canon to 
ensure adherence to the Framers’ structure of carefully divided powers204—a 
structure that supermajority voting rules in their nature recalibrate and dis-
tort.205 
This substance-over-form principle has found expression in a rich variety 
of formulations, all of which apply with full force here. Our constitutional law 
“reaches past formalism.”206 Thus, “we must look . . . behind labels”207 and 
past “semantics”208 to the “substance” of things209—that is, how a rule works 
                                                                                                                           
nation of the exaction, and viewing its substance and application”); id. at 2597 (emphasizing that 
“labels should not control here”); id. at 2605 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer and Kagan, J.) (asserting 
that, when “in reality” a law does not operate in accordance with its title, that title is “irrelevant” in 
determining constitutionality); id. at 2660 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (rea-
soning that “Congress effectively engages in . . . impermissible compulsion when state participation in 
a federal spending program is coerced” so as to render “illusory” the states’ supposed right to decline 
offered funds). 
 203 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (invalidating a “procedural” rule because “[i]n 
practical operation [it] produce[d] a result which the State could not command directly”); see, e.g., 
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 239 (1911) (holding that “[i]t is apparent that a constitutional prohi-
bition cannot be transgressed indirectly by the creation of a . . . presumption any more than it can be 
violated by direct enactment” and that “[t]he power to create presumptions is not a means of escape 
from the constitutional restrictions”). 
 204 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 444 (1998) (holding unconstitutional the 
Line Item Veto Act because presidential “cancellations pursuant to [it] are the functional equivalent of 
partial repeals of Acts of Congress that fail to satisfy Article I, § 7”); see also id. at 469 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (reasoning that “the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation . . . is preeminently not a doc-
trine of technicalities” and disagreeing with the majority based on the view that “insofar as the sub-
stance of [the President’s] action is concerned, it is no different than what Congress has permitted the 
President to do since the formation of the Union”). 
 205 For discussion of the problematic impact of supermajority voting rules on the constitutional 
separation of powers, see Susan Loh Bloch, Congressional Self-Discipline: The Constitutionality of 
Supermajority Voting Rules, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 3–5 (1997); Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitu-
tion, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 761–68 (2012); Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065, 2082–84 (2013); and Coenen, supra note 6, at 1112–17. One subtle illus-
tration of this difficulty has been identified in recent political science research, which suggests that 
Rule XXII has contributed to a “huge transfer of power to the Supreme Court,” which “now almost 
always has the last word, even in decisions that theoretically invite a Congressional response.” Adam 
Liptak, In Congress’s Paralysis, a Mightier Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2012, at A10 
(summarizing these findings). Another related point is that critical decision making has been shifted 
by default from Congress to administrative agencies, “where power is exercised less transparently and 
accountability to voters is less direct.” Robert B. Reich, Op-Ed., The Real Price of Congress’s Grid-
lock, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2013, at A23. 
 206 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 595 (1992). 
 207 City of Detroit v. Murray Corp. of Am., 355 U.S. 489, 492 (1958). 
 208 United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 192–93 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31 (1971)). 
 209 Id. 
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“in practical terms,”210 in its “practical consequences,”211 and with regard to 
“practical concerns.”212 Over and over, the Court has insisted that we “must be 
vigilant to scrutinize the attendant facts with an eye to . . . prevent violations of 
the constitution by circuitous . . . methods.”213 Otherwise, the “guaranties em-
bedded in the Constitution of the United States may . . . be manipulated out of 
existence”214 and “easily evaded.”215 
In sum, under controlling constitutional law, it is the “practical operation” 
of legislatively created rules,216 rather than the “form of descriptive words,”217 
that controls their constitutionality. Given the recognized real-world effects of 
current cloture practice, this principle dictates that Rule XXII now offends the 
constitutional prohibition on supermajority legislative voting requirements.218 
Indeed, one could easily advance reinforcing arguments here by noting that (1) 
the Cloture Rule imposes a supermajority voting mechanism as a matter of 
purpose as well as effect;219 (2) the substance-over-form norm should take hold 
with special force in this context because of the “fundamental” nature of the 
principle of legislative majoritarianism;220 and (3) the current operation of 
Rule XXII in a way that is “[s]weeping”221 and “far-reaching”222—rather than 
“confined” and discrete”223—magnifies the constitutional problem.224 
                                                                                                                           
 210 Bowshar v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986). 
 211 Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 431 (1946). 
 212 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008). 
 213 Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 32 (1927); accord, e.g., Bailey, 219 U.S. at 244 (empha-
sizing, for this reason, that the government “may not do indirectly” what it cannot do directly). 
 214 Gomillian v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345 (1960) (quoting Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Ry. 
Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926)). 
 215 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 831 (1995). 
 216 Speiser, 357 U.S. at 526. 
 217 Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 363 (1941). 
 218 Accord, e.g., Benjamin Lieber & Patrick Brown, On Supermajorities and the Constitution, 83 
GEO. L.J. 2347, 2383 (1995) (indicating that the Cloture Rule “effectively institutes a supermajority 
voting requirement . . . contrary to the Constitution’s mandate of simple majority rule”). 
 219 See Hatch, supra note 3, at 823 (recognizing that “frustrating the will of the Senate majority 
was squarely the objective” of recent filibuster efforts); id. at 859 (“These filibusters are intended to 
manipulate Senate rules to accomplish the political objective of defeating specific judicial nomina-
tions.”); see also supra note 189 (detailing the views of Senator Alexander). 
 220 THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, supra note 70, at 397 (James Madison); accord THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 22, supra note 70, at 139 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 221 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (stating that the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act raised constitutional red flags in part because it targeted state laws “of almost every de-
scription”). 
 222 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); see id. at 632 (adding that the challenged state law 
presented difficulties in part because of its “broad and undifferentiated” application). 
 223 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532–33. 
 224 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012) (emphasizing, in finding a 
First Amendment violation, that the challenged statute applies to statements “made at any time, in any 
place, to any person,” thus giving it a “sweeping, quite unprecedented reach”). Indeed, the impact of 
Rule XXII is far greater, and thus more legally problematic, than first meets the eye. The current re-
gime, after all, bears down not only on actual laws, but on every measure the Senate even considers 
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In addition, the modern operation of Rule XXII presents constitutional 
difficulties that are in some ways even graver than those that would be raised 
by explicit supermajority voting rules made directly applicable to final Senate 
actions. The problem is that the stealth filibuster system undermines the proper 
operation of our political processes precisely because of its stealthy nature. In 
particular, the Framers recognized that sound self-rule requires the meaningful 
accountability of elected officials,225 which in turn puts a premium on open 
government.226 Recent developments in Senate practice, however, have shifted 
the essential nature of filibustering from on-the-floor public speechmaking to 
under-the-radar, backroom obstruction.227 For this reason, current Senate prac-
tice raises a distinctive risk of voter confusion. The electorate, after all, might 
attribute the failure to honor campaign promises to majority party Senators 
because the electorate put them in control of the legislative body. The majority 
party, however, no longer does control the Senate precisely because of Rule 
                                                                                                                           
enacting. Indeed, it overhangs every measure that any Senator might even consider proposing. See 
WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note 170, at 27, 157. In other words, the constitutionally problematic 
effects of the Senate filibuster rule touch the entire federal lawmaking process, including every action 
of any kind that any Senator might simply think about pursuing. An informative contrast is provided 
in the 1971 Supreme Court decision in Gordon v. Lance. 403 U.S. 1, 6 (1971). That case presented the 
question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s one-person-one-vote principle precluded West 
Virginia from requiring a sixty percent majority of local referendum voters to approve the issuance of 
bonds and some tax increases. Id. at 2. In upholding this state-imposed supermajority voting rule, the 
Court noted that “a simple majority vote is insufficient on some issues” even under the federal Consti-
tution. Id. at 6. Building on this truism, the Court found no problem in a state’s imposition of super-
majority voting requirements for “certain decisions” because the majority need not “always prevail on 
every issue.” Id. at 6–7. In other words, it was permissible for a state to make it “more difficult for 
some kinds of governmental actions to be taken.” Id. at 5–6. As Professor Laurence Tribe has ob-
served, Gordon reflects the idea that governmental sovereigns may single out a special category of 
“those things it deems fundamental,” which as a consequence may be made distinctly “resistant to 
change by ordinary majorities.” LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 13–17, at 
1096 n.3 (2d ed. 1988). In the federal system, as we have seen, that singling out occurs in the Consti-
tution itself. See, e.g., supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text (noting the endorsement of this idea 
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Ballin). Under the logic of Gordon, the Senate’s implemen-
tation of still more supermajority voting requirements—especially on a far-reaching, generally-
applicable basis—is not tenable. 
 225 See generally COENEN, supra note 197, at 125–26 (collecting materials from The Federalist 
on this point). 
 226 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, supra note 70, at 517 (Alexander Hamilton) (praising the 
constitutional provision that deals with presidential appointment and Senate confirmation of govern-
ment officers, in part because these actions “would naturally become matters of notoriety; and the 
public would be at no loss to determine what part had been performed by the different actors”). 
 227 See, e.g., Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 206 (“In most cases, the two-track system 
keeps filibusters out of the public eye.”); id. at 181 (“Filibusters are ubiquitous but virtually invisible, 
for the contemporary Senate practice does not require a senator to hold the floor to filibuster; senators 
filibuster simply by indicating to the Senate leadership that they intend to do so.”). 
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XXII’s minority-empowering operation.228 It follows that the stealth system 
may well perversely render the very Senators who exploit it “insulated from 
the electoral ramifications of their decision,” thus producing an electoral envi-
ronment in which “[a]ccountability is . . . diminished.”229 
These supplementary arguments based on purpose, fundamentality, 
sweep, and accountability all carry constitutional weight. None of them, how-
ever, is essential to establish Rule XXII’s invalidity. It is enough, as we have 
seen, to conclude that the Rule operates to impose a supermajority requirement 
in its practical operation.230 And the drumbeat of pronouncements by academ-
ics, journalists, Senators, and others—all to the same and telling effect—
indicates that Rule XXII now works just that way.231 
C. The Failed Defenses of Supermajority Cloture Practice 
Confronted with this state of affairs, defenders of modern-day filibuster 
practice might resort to the device of confession and avoidance. In other 
words, they might claim that—notwithstanding the obvious constitutional 
problems that the stealth filibuster system raises—countervailing justifications 
                                                                                                                           
 228 See id. at 184 (noting that the filibuster creates “a minority veto”); Harkin, supra note 4, at 69 
(“[T]hanks to the filibuster, even when a party has been resoundingly repudiated at the polls, that 
party retains the power to prevent the majority from governing.”). 
 229 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (noting the importance of legislator 
accountability in the context of setting forth constitutional principles of federalism). Senator Merkley 
has offered one elaboration of this point, reasoning that, “rather than seeing obstruction and placing 
responsibility with the minority, the public sees inaction and blames the majority” and that “this is one 
reason the silent filibuster is so tempting to the minority.” Merkley, supra note 153. To his credit, 
Professor Gerhardt, even while defending Senate practice against constitutional challenge, also has 
acknowledged the reality and seriousness of this problem. See Chafetz & Gerhardt, supra note 10 at 
256 (Gerhardt) (noting that today’s “silent filibusters . . . are problematic because they obscure one of 
the most important checks on abuses of the filibuster: the political accountability of the members of 
the Senate,” and adding that “[t]he two-track system provides the wrong incentives to senators: it 
allows them to obstruct Senate business but without paying much, if any, political cost for doing so”). 
For a related point, see Reich, supra note 205, which notes a reduction in the openness and accounta-
bility that stems from the filibuster system’s shifting of government power from elected representa-
tives to unelected agency officials. 
 230 See supra notes 130–165 and accompanying text. 
 231 See generally supra notes 166–193 and accompanying text (discussing the Rule’s modern 
operation). Indeed, it may even be that “a simple analogy clinches this case.” Florida v. Jardine, 133 
S. Ct. 1409, 1418 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring). Consider a Senate Rule that states: “It shall be a rule 
of this body that no bill shall be voted on by the Senate unless it first receives a favorable pre-vote by 
60 members.” Could such a rule be constitutional because it technically purports not to deal with final 
votes, but only with “pre-votes”? No, because such a result would fly in the face of the substance-
over-form principle. In its current operation, however, Rule XXII works this way in practical opera-
tion, by effectively requiring a supermajority “pre-vote” on pending matters that channels de facto 
decision making control to legislative minorities. 
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properly recognized by our law override those difficulties.232 There are three 
historic defenses of the supermajority cloture mechanism embodied in Rule 
XXII. Those defenses focus on: (1) longstanding acceptance;233 (2) the value 
of legislative debate and deliberation;234 and (3) the claimed difficulty of con-
straining any principle that would render invalid the supermajority filibuster 
rule.235 All of these justifications for the Senate’s supermajority-based filibus-
ter-control system, however, have lost their sting with the emergence of the 
modern stealth system. And the resulting absence of any sound defense for 
present-day cloture practice serves to confirm its unconstitutionality. 
1. The History-Based Justification 
The first defense of Rule XXII resonates with Holmes’s famous aphorism 
that “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.”236 According to this argu-
ment, the Senate’s supermajoritarian treatment of filibusters has gained valida-
tion from its steady use for more than two centuries.237 Continuous adherence 
to an approach launched in 1806, so the argument goes, suffices to establish 
the sort of “consistent historical practice” that renders Rule XXII immune to 
constitutional attack.238 
The difficulty with this history-based defense is that it overlooks the rele-
vant history.239 The Supreme Court has rightly emphasized that the approach of 
our earliest Congresses provides the best usage-based indicator of the Consti-
tution’s governing meaning.240 But there is no indication that our earliest rep-
resentatives—who best knew the understood meaning of the then recently rati-
fied Constitution—meant to tolerate minority control of legislative decision 
making in the Senate or the House.241 And even if the Senate’s earliest history 
                                                                                                                           
 232 Cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (noting that even gov-
ernmental race discrimination, for example, will stand if it is “suitably tailored to serve a compelling 
state interest”). 
 233 See infra notes 236–253 and accompanying text. 
 234 See infra notes 254–261 and accompanying text. 
 235 See infra notes 262–271 and accompanying text. 
 236 N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). 
 237 See supra notes 136–158 and accompanying text. 
 238 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204 (2003). See generally Chafetz & Gerhardt, supra note 
10, at 265 (Gerhardt) (arguing that the filibuster “is directly traceable to and based on . . . earlier, 
longstanding practices”); id. at 253 (“[H]istorical practices overwhelmingly support the filibuster’s 
constitutionality.”); McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 9, at 497 (claiming that “continuous use of 
filibusters since the early Republic provides compelling support for their constitutionality”). 
 239 See, e.g., Ornstein, supra note 141, at 74 (emphasizing the “unprecedented” nature of modern 
filibuster practice). See generally supra notes 130–158 (detailing the historical developments that 
have produced dramatic modern changes). 
 240 See supra note 135 (setting forth illustrative authorities on this point). 
 241 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 82, at 364 (noting that, in fact “[n]othing like Rule 22’s catch-22 
was in place in the age of George Washington or in the Jeffersonian era that followed” but instead that 
“[t]hroughout the 1790s and early 1800s, the Senate practiced and preached simple majority rule”); 
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were somehow to count for nothing, the current stealth filibuster system began 
to take hold only in the 1970s242 and did not gather full steam until much more 
recently than that.243 Put simply, if modern scholarship in this area establishes 
anything at all, it is that present day cloture practice is far removed from, ra-
ther than closely tied to, more than 180 years of Senate operations.244 
No less important, the functional characteristics of the stealth filibuster 
system distinguish it from its forebears in ways that are constitutionally signif-
icant. We have seen, for example, that modern Senate practice raises new 
threats to legislative accountability.245 A no less serious problem stems from 
the shift in incentives that it has brought about. Specifically, by greatly reduc-
ing the political costs of minority intransigence,246 the modern behind-the-
scenes operation of cloture practice has removed the self-regulating feature of 
filibustering that once served to curb its abuse.247 A true filibuster—pursuant to 
which dissenters openly take and hold the Senate floor—threatens to saddle 
dissenters with opprobrium by exposing their actions for all to see, making 
vivid their willingness to throw a wrench in the workings of the upper cham-
ber.248 In times gone by, the need to filibuster in this way had exactly this de-
                                                                                                                           
see also supra notes 132–135 (detailing the Senate’s pre-1806 majoritarian approach for dealing with 
potential delay and obstruction). 
 242 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 243 See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 244 See, e.g., Chafetz, supra note 5, at 1017 (“Any purported history of ‘unlimited debate’ is im-
material, because, as we have already seen, the modern filibuster is not about debate. . . . [and] the 
historical record is emphatically not pro-filibuster.”); Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 185–86 
(noting that “the filibuster, as currently used, is not part of an age-old and inviolate Senate tradition of 
unlimited debate,” and stating that “[i]f the filibuster as it is currently employed had existed from the 
time of its founding, the argument for its constitutionality would be strengthened. But the practice of 
filibustering has not remained the same over time.”); Udall, supra note 160, at 122 (“The modern 
filibuster bears faint resemblance to its historical predecessors.”). 
 245 See Jacobi & VanDam, supra note 150, at 282 (“[I]f the public can never see a filibuster, they 
can never be galvanized against it.”); see also supra note 229 and accompanying text (discussing 
public perception of Congress and how the stealth filibuster may obscure causes of legislative inac-
tion). 
 246 WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note 170, at 260 (arguing that the filibuster, in its current form, 
is “virtually costless for bill opponents”). 
 247 See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 215 (observing that “it is the stealth aspect of the 
filibuster that permits its widespread threat to constitute an effective supermajority requirement for 
much Senate action”); Byrd, supra note 157 (noting that, for most of the Senate’s history, “[t]rue 
filibusters were . . . less frequent, and more commonly discouraged, due to every Senator’s under-
standing that such undertakings required grueling personal sacrifice, exhausting preparation, and a 
willingness to be criticized for disrupting the nation’s business”). 
 248 See, e.g., WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note 170, at 260 (discussing the contrasting operation 
of modern “costless filibustering”); Chafetz, supra note 5, at 1010 (noting that traditional filibusters 
required the “filibusterer [to] justify his tying up the entire business of the Senate to his constituents or 
colleagues, and [to] summon the physical endurance to hold the Senate floor”). 
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terrent effect.249 The modern stealth system, in contrast, imposes no similar 
internal check on minority overreaching.250 
The removal of this self-regulating feature of the filibuster mechanism is 
of functional importance, as illustrated by the dramatic rise in the use of that 
mechanism in recent decades.251 It also raises special constitutional difficulties 
under Supreme Court precedent by heightening the risks to constitutional val-
ues that the practice poses.252 The broader point is that efforts to defend the 
stealth filibuster system based on longstanding practice stand on feet of clay. In 
fact, longstanding practice cuts against validation of the stealth system precise-
ly because that system has dramatically altered—rather than carried forward—
the Senate’s traditional manner of operating.253 
                                                                                                                           
 249 See Jacobi & VanDam, supra note 150, at 291 (noting that filibusters “only became a standard 
fixture after the requirement to actually stand up and speak disappeared”); see also supra notes 141, 
167. 
 250 See Eidelson, supra note 157, at 989 (noting that modern system “reduces the cost of filibus-
tering, since the opponents of a measure no longer need to hold the floor for hours on end or conspic-
uously identify themselves as obstructionists”); Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 203 (emphasiz-
ing that “[t]he stealth filibuster is easier, both physically and politically”); Ornstein, supra note 141, at 
77–78 (describing how the filibuster was changed, at first, to help Senate leaders in moving along 
their agendas, but adding that this “well-intentioned move” had “unintended consequences”: “instead 
of expediting business, the change in practice meant an increase in filibusters because it became so 
much easier to raise the bar to 60 or more, with no 12- or 24-hour marathon speeches required”); 
Friedman & Martin, supra note 153 (“Not only has it become easier to ‘filibuster,’ but tracking means 
there are far fewer consequences when the minority party or even one willful member of Congress 
does so, because the Senate can carry on with other things.”). 
 251 See supra notes 157, 167–170 and accompanying text. 
 252 As to the constitutional significance of governing structures that tend to constrain or encour-
age affronts to constitutional values, see, for example, Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 
429, 444 n.18, 447 (1978), in which the Court stated that there would be less reason to take an activist 
role when a “State’s own political processes will act as a check on local regulations that unduly bur-
den interstate commerce.” 
 253 There is another serious difficulty with any “longstanding practice” defense of the stealth 
filibuster system. The difficulty is that this style of constitutional argument is typically advanced to 
help justify long-employed exercises of federal lawmaking power. Exercises of federal lawmaking 
power, however, contrast markedly with senatorial rulemaking power because lawmaking, unlike 
rulemaking, requires joint action by both the Senate and the House, and either concurrence by the 
Chief Executive or a supermajoritarian override of a presidential veto by both chambers of Congress. 
Common sense suggests that such extraordinarily collaborative action, reflecting the collective views 
of varying centers of power, raises a strong presumption as to the constitutionality of a practice, espe-
cially when it is persisted in over long periods of time. Senate Rules, however, cannot lay claim to the 
same sort of presumption because they emanate only from the Senate and thus require approval by 
neither the House nor the President. Indeed, it is not easy to conclude that Rule XXII’s sixty-vote 
requirement enjoys longstanding support even within the Senate itself—at least if the relevant inquiry 
focuses on majority support—given the specification that that Rule can itself be undone only by a 
two-thirds, rather than a majority, vote. See supra notes 236–238 and accompanying text. Of no less 
significance, the Rules of Proceedings Clause does not channel authority only to the Senate. Rather, it 
applies equally to both the Senate and House, and in actual practice “[i]n the House, majority-rule 
rules today and has always ruled,” AMAR, supra note 82, at 366, with the sole exception being House 
Rule XXI, which was not adopted until 1994. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. The point is 
this: Any constitutional boost that modern Senate filibuster practice might gain on the basis of 
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2. The Debate-and-Deliberation Defense 
An alternative defense of the Senate’s filibuster-control system rests on 
the idea that open debate and unhurried deliberation are good things. It fol-
lows, according to this line of thought, that the minority-protecting effect of 
the Cloture Rule serves a valuable end because it slows down legislative pro-
ceedings, so as to produce more studied, more thoughtful, and more reliable 
legislative decision making.254 The difficulty with this analysis is that the Clo-
ture Rule of today has all but nothing to do with fostering debate and delibera-
tion.255 Indeed, under current practice, “a vote against cloture does not lead to 
extended floor debate”; rather, “it leads to no floor debate.”256 A system that 
                                                                                                                           
longstanding Senate practice is feeble at best because of recent and radical changes in that practice. 
But even assuming that some such tenuous boost were otherwise available, it is counterbalanced by 
the House’s unitary adherence for more than two centuries to the norm of majority rule in applying 
exactly the same Rules of Proceedings Clause on which defenders of Senate filibuster rules rely. Put 
simply, if longstanding practice matters in interpreting the Rules of Proceedings Clause, it supports on 
the better view the principle of mandatory-majority—rather than permissible-supermajority—
legislative decision making. 
 254 See, e.g., John C. Roberts, Majority Voting in Congress: Further Notes on the Constitutional-
ity of the Senate Cloture Rule, 20 J.L. & POL. 505, 511 (2004) (arguing that there may be “[no] better 
device to slow down precipitous action or force full consideration of the pros and cons of a controver-
sial measure than extended debate”). Put another way, by requiring a supermajority vote, the Cloture 
Rule creates a world in which at least two things are true. First, rash majorities cannot ram proposals 
through the Senate. See id. at 509, 511 (noting that “the Framers intended that the Senate have [a] vital 
function in the new government; they expected the second chamber to act as a check on rash or un-
wise action in the House” through the exercise of “more mature reflection”). And, second, minority 
voices can be fully heard, thus expanding opportunities to “expose flaws in and potential improve-
ments to proposed bills.” WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY 
PROCESS 27 (4th ed. 1996) (adding that, while “House rules are designed to permit a determined ma-
jority to work its will,” the “Senate rules . . . are intended to slow down, or even defer, action on legis-
lation by granting inordinate parliamentary power (through the filibuster, for example) to individual 
members and determined minorities”). 
 255 See, e.g., Chafetz, supra note 5, at 1017 (“[T]he modern filibuster is not about debate.”); 
Cornyn, supra note 37, at 194 (bemoaning “[t]he current use of the standing rules of the Senate, not to 
ensure adequate debate, but to change the voting rule on judicial nominations from a simple majority 
to 60 votes in order to block a Senate majority from confirming judges”); Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra 
note 5, at 184 (“The modern filibuster . . . has little to do with deliberation and even less to do with 
debate.”); Harkin, supra note 4, at 73 (“[T]he current use of the filibuster has little to do with delibera-
tion and everything to do with obstruction and delay.”); Magliocca, supra note 145, at 315 (“In effect, 
modern cloture practice operates as a gag rule.”). According to Senator Harkin: 
There is absolutely no reason to filibuster a motion to proceed except as a means of de-
lay and obstruction. If a Senator does not like a piece of legislation, he or she has the 
opportunity to offer amendments to try to improve the measure. But Senators cannot do 
that if the Senate is prevented from even considering and debating a bill. 
Harkin supra note 4, at 75. 
 256 Magliocca, supra note 145, at 306 (emphasis added); accord, e.g., Chafetz, supra note 5, at 
1040 (arguing that “[t]he contemporary filibuster is not a mechanism of debate; it is a mechanism of 
obstruction, plain and simple”); Eidelson, supra note 157, at 989 (stating that “when a senator or 
group of senators signals an intention to filibuster a measure, the majority leader typically does not 
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does not promote debate—but, rather, discourages it from occurring—is hardly 
justifiable on debate-enhancement grounds. 
The desideratum of facilitating deliberation also provides no meaningful 
support for modern cloture practice.257 To be sure, stealth filibusters halt action 
on pending matters, so that one might say they generate a less hasty considera-
tion of them.258 There is, however, a deep difficulty in building a defense of 
Rule XXII on this idea. The problem is that any such defense necessarily rests 
on the proposition that it is proper to slow down legislative action by requiring 
sixty, rather than fifty-one, votes to act. In other words, the way in which the 
stealth filibuster system fosters delay and deliberation is the same way that 
outright supermajority voting rules foster delay and deliberation—that is, by 
requiring a supermajority, rather than a majority, to move forward with taking 
legislative action.259 
For this reason, the deliberation-enhancement justification for the Sen-
ate’s current filibuster regime simply moves it from the constitutional frying 
pan into the constitutional fire. It does not help the case for constitutionality to 
recognize that the stealth filibuster system fosters deliberation only because it 
operates in the same way as does an overt supermajority voting requirement 
for acting on legislative proposals. Instead, this fact makes it all the more ap-
parent that the two types of rules are “functionally the same,”260 so that the 
former is no less unconstitutional than the latter.261 
                                                                                                                           
bring the measure up for live debate at all, instead filing a cloture motion and endeavoring to assemble 
the sixty votes necessary to win the cloture vote,” while “the Senate proceeds to other business on a 
second track, unhindered by the dilatory debate that the cloture motion nominally exists to curtail”); 
Jacobi & VanDam, supra note 150, at 277 (noting that “[b]efore unique episodes in 2010 and 2013, 
the last actual filibuster had occurred in 1992,” and suggesting that the lack of a need “to deliver 
longwinded stemwinders . . . mak[es] minorities even more powerful”); id. at 281 (“[N]o one ever 
‘talks and talks’ anymore when filibustering; the term now simply refers to a flat minoritarian hold on 
any piece of legislation or nomination.”); id. at 317 (“[A]ctual filibusters no longer occur.”); Klein, 
supra note 1, at 26, 28 (“Today nobody talks. The filibuster is an exclusively procedural tool [that] no 
longer has anything to do with debate”); see also WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note 170, at 260 
(“The contemporary context of lawmaking in the Senate has essentially eliminated the informational 
benefits that used to accrue from these kinds of battles.”). 
 257 See Eidelson, supra note 157, at 990 (noting that “the filibuster debate is not really about the 
Senate’s internal rules for governing its deliberative processes”). 
 258 Cf. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 221 (suggesting that, if “filibusters force intense 
negotiation between the majority and the minority, filibusters may actually prompt more careful con-
sideration of statutory language than a bill might otherwise receive”). 
 259 See, e.g., supra note 189 (discussing, among other things, comments of Senator Alexander). 
 260 United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 854 (1996). 
 261 See supra notes 196–218 and accompanying text (discussing substance-over-form principle of 
constitutional interpretation). 
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3. The Slippery Slope Justification 
The final argument against invalidating the Senate filibuster regime tries 
to ride the slippery slope. According to this argument, if a principle of legisla-
tive majoritarianism renders modern cloture practice unconstitutional, the re-
sulting effect will be a catastrophic disruption of the entire federal legislative 
process.262 All sorts of critical decisions, so the argument goes, are made by 
legislative minorities. A single committee can keep a bill from moving for-
ward, and a single committee chair can impede committee review. One or two 
Senate leaders might block consideration of a bill by pushing it to the back of 
the legislative agenda. Another few Senators might derail its enactment by 
proposing amendments late in a legislative session. In these and other ways, a 
minority of Senators—even a small minority—can squelch the enactment of a 
law that enjoys majority support.263 And so, according to the slippery-slope 
critique, if a principle of legislative majoritarianism outlaws the Senate’s coun-
termajoritarian cloture practice, that same principle must outlaw these other—
and widely accepted—countermajoritarian bill-killing practices as well.264 
This argument fails because it misidentifies the constitutional principle 
that controls in this context. That principle is not one that prohibits the taking 
of any significant action in the Senate by anybody (or any body) other than a 
majority of its members. Rather, the governing principle is one that prohibits 
supermajority voting rules applicable to the full body of the Senate as it takes 
dispositive action on a specific proposal as that proposal is considered by that 
body as a whole. Such a principle does not speak to efficiency-based gatekeep-
ing rules, such as those that concern committee review, committee chair discre-
tion, or the calendaring of legislative business by duly designated leaders of 
the chamber. Even more emphatically, this principle does not concern parlia-
mentary maneuvering by individual Senators—whether that maneuvering 
comes in the form of amendment-proposing, outright horse-trading, or infor-
mal accommodations secured from Senate leaders. 
The crux of the matter is that none of these actions runs afoul of a consti-
tutional principle that prohibits self-imposition of supermajority voting re-
                                                                                                                           
 262 See Chafetz & Gerhardt, supra note 10, at 255, 267 (Gerhardt). 
 263 As Professor Gerhardt explains: 
[T]he filibuster is one of many Senate procedures that may preclude final floor action. 
When committees reject nominations or committee chairs refuse to schedule hearings or 
votes on nominations or other legislative matters, their decisions are effectively final. 
Yet none of these procedures violates Article I, Section 7. The fact that a bill or nomi-
nation is stymied through the tactical use of procedures does not mean that Article I, 
Section 7 is violated: it means the Senate has followed its own rules. 
Id. 
 264 Id. at 267 (Gerhardt) (arguing that an end to the filibuster “would signify the end of the Sen-
ate’s numerous other countermajoritarian features, practices, rules, traditions, and norms”). 
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quirements for the full Senate when the full Senate acts. As a practical matter, 
however, the sixty-vote requirement of Rule XXII now works just this way.265 
The Rule is unconstitutional for this reason. To reach that conclusion, however, 
says nothing about matters that do not involve voting by the full body of the 
Senate, such as decision making by committees or, for that matter, outcome-
determinative delays produced by individual Senators through actual 
speechmaking on the Senate floor.266 
In the end, the argument for the Senate’s modern Cloture Rule rests large-
ly on florid rhetoric.267 Defenders of the Rule are drawn to sound-bite descrip-
tions of the Senate as the “greatest deliberative body in the world.”268 No less 
of an expert than Senator John McCain, however, recently dismissed this char-
acterization as “the greatest exaggeration in history.”269 Proponents of modern 
practice also point to President George Washington’s (perhaps apocryphal) 
portrayal of the Senate as a saucer into which the heated actions of the House 
                                                                                                                           
 265 See supra notes 190–191 and accompanying text. 
 266 Another consideration also serves to distinguish Rule XXII from other nonmajoritarian bill-
blocking mechanisms: 
There’s a difference between the use of the filibuster to derail a nomination and the use 
of other Senate rules—on scheduling, on not having a floor vote without prior commit-
tee action, etc.—to do so. All those other rules . . . can be overridden by a majority vote 
of the Senate . . . whereas the filibuster can’t be overridden in that way. A majority of 
the Senate could ride herd on a rogue Judiciary Committee chair who refused to hold a 
hearing on some nominee; it can’t do so with respect to a filibuster. 
Cornyn, supra note 37, at 226. For further observations along these same lines, see Chafetz & Ger-
hardt, supra note 10, at 260–61 (Chafetz), in which the author notes that “none of these [mechanisms] 
results in the permanent minority obstruction of legislation the way today’s filibuster does.” 
 267 See, e.g., Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 187 n.25 (noting, for example, historical ac-
counts of the filibuster that emphasize “in [a] reverential tone, the value of debate and deliberation”); 
Hatch, supra note 3, at 835 (noting that Rule XXII proponents frequently resort to the tea-cooling-
saucer imagery described below, infra note 270 and accompanying text, and adding that they “use this 
metaphor as if uttering it alone justifies filibusters”). 
 268 Marvin E. Adams, The United States Senate, “A Change Is Gonna Come,” OUR DAILY THREAD 
(Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.ourdailythread.org/content/united-states-senate-change-gonna-come, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/6DWE-Q5F3 (purporting to quote former President James Buchanan). 
 269 Ed Morrissey, McCain: Why Are These Republicans Trying to Block Gun Control?, HOT AIR 
(Apr. 8, 2013, 8:41 AM), http://hotair.com/archives/2013/04/08/mccain-why-are-these-republicans-
trying-to-block-gun-control, archived at http://perma.cc/FJ37-HKHH; see also Packer, supra note 157, at 
41 (quoting Senator Merkley as stating “I wince each time I hear [the ‘greatest deliberative body’ phrase], 
because the amount of real deliberation, in terms of exchange of ideas, is so limited”). Notably (and sad-
ly), recent media reports suggest that prospective candidates are opting out of Senate races because of 
perceptions of the body’s now-dysfunctional character. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, As Senators Head for 
Exit, Few Step Up to Run for Seats, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2013, at A13 (quoting Louisiana’s Republican 
Lieutenant Governor Jay Dardenne, “who decided not to run next year against Senator Mary L. Landrieu, 
a Democrat considered among the most vulnerable,” as stating “I don’t know that you’d find any legisla-
tive body in America—or the world—that’s as dysfunctional”). 
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are wisely poured to cool.270 It is one thing, however, to let hot tea cool off; it 
is another thing to stop brewing it altogether. 
Neither President Washington nor any member of the founding generation 
argued that sixty votes could be required to take legislative action. Indeed, just 
the opposite is true. The Framers endorsed the principle that legislative majori-
ties, not supermajorities, must control the fate of substantive decision making 
in both the House and the Senate.271 Because the modern stealth filibuster sys-
tem offends this principle, it is unconstitutional. 
IV. REMEDYING THE CONSTITUTIONAL WRONG 
The preceding discussion shows that current cloture practice abridges a 
binding norm of majority-based voting in the chambers of Congress. Given 
this constitutional violation, a remedy must be devised. Moreover, at a mini-
mum, that remedy must guard against continuing unconstitutional conduct. 
Several remedial approaches are available. One of them envisions leaving 
the existing non-speech-centered Senate filibuster-control system in place.272 
Adjustments to the system would be made, however, to shift its effect from 
vesting minority blocs with controlling voting power to facilitating meaningful 
deliberation. Under an alternative approach, the existing regime would be jetti-
soned in favor of the same sort of system that guided the Senate’s work for 
most of its history—that is, a system that focuses cloture votes on actual Sen-
ate speechmaking.273 The ensuing discussion shows that either strategy could 
remedy existing constitutional problems. Before turning to those matters, how-
ever, it is worth pausing to consider the significance of the so-called “nuclear 
option” and the Senate’s recent exercise of it to abandon the use of supermajor-
ity cloture votes in assessing most presidential nominees.274 
A. The Impact of the Nuclear Option 
As we have seen, Rule XXII now supports a system of minority voting 
control in the Senate. Indeed, minority blocs can and do leverage Rule XXII in 
many ways to ensure that supermajority support—rather than majority sup-
port—is needed to pass bills and resolutions as a routine matter. For example, 
Senate leaders often give Rule XXII effect by declining to place items on the 
legislative agenda unless they already have, or may get, sixty votes in their 
                                                                                                                           
 270 BELL, supra note 1, at 9–10 (quoting a Senate website that recounts supposed exchange be-
tween President Washington and Thomas Jefferson). 
 271 See supra notes 79–124 and accompanying text. 
 272 See infra notes 287–299 and accompanying text. 
 273 See infra notes 300–311 and accompanying text. 
 274 See infra notes 275–286 and accompanying text. 
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support.275 In addition, if a matter does make its way before the Senate, it can 
advance only with a favorable vote on a “motion to proceed”; yet, because 
Rule XXII applies to such motions, the proposal may well be defeated at this 
stage unless sixty Senators agree to move it forward.276 Finally, even if a mo-
tion to proceed carries, Rule XXII permits a minority to demand a cloture vote 
at other, later decision points—such as in processing proposed amendments to 
a bill.277 In practical terms, all of this means that, so long as a determined mi-
nority so insists, sixty votes are required for the Senate to act.278 
Further disrupting the opportunity for majority control in the upper cham-
ber is that portion of Rule XXII that by its terms requires a two-thirds vote of 
members who are present and voting to secure cloture on motions to amend the 
Senate’s rules, including the generally applicable sixty-vote Cloture Rule es-
tablished by Rule XXII.279 In the past, this two-thirds vote rule frustrated ef-
forts at filibuster reform. After all, if a majority of Senators wished to change 
the basic sixty-vote Cloture Rule so as to shut down a threatened or ongoing 
filibuster, they first had to secure even more than sixty votes to make that 
change happen. Things took a dramatic turn, however, on November 21, 2013, 
when a majority of fifty-two Democrats wielded the so-called “nuclear option” 
to require only fifty-one votes, rather than sixty votes, to secure cloture on con-
firmations of all presidential nominees except Supreme Court Justices.280 
The end result of this reform was both important and salutary because it 
served to bring Senate practice into closer alignment with constitutional re-
quirements. At the same time, the Senate’s action raises significant questions, 
including as to whether the majority acted in proper conformance with its rules 
and traditions in proceeding as it did.281 Those questions lie beyond the scope 
of this Article. Important for present purposes, however, are two key points 
about the November reform. First, in a sharp break from past practice, the Sen-
ate demonstrated its ability to circumvent Rule XXII’s dictates, in the face of a 
filibuster, by simple majority vote. Second, this action raises obvious tensions 
                                                                                                                           
 275 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 276 See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 277 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 278 See supra notes 168–170 and accompanying text. 
 279 See U.S. SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN, supra note 2, at 20–21 (setting forth the opera-
tive language of Rule XXII). In other words, the sixty-vote cloture standard of Rule XXII does not 
stand alone; it also includes a separate and specialized provision as to cloture of debate on proposed 
changes to the rules themselves. See id. at 20–22. This requirement—which appears between two 
hyphens in Rule XXII—provides that cloture on proposed rule changes requires a two-thirds vote of 
the number of Senators present and voting. Id. 
 280 Jeremy W. Peters, Senate Vote Curbs Filibuster Power to Stall Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
22, 2013 at A16. 
 281 By way of illustration, some critics might argue that any change to the Senate Rules, whether 
of a formal or de facto nature, must occur at the outset of a new Senate session. See Hatch, supra note 
3, at 851. 
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with the previously accepted premises that underlay Rule XXII. Against this 
backdrop, it is necessary to ask what the ongoing impact of this “November 
2013 Revolution” will be. Three observations are of dominating importance on 
this score. 
First, however dramatic the Senate’s use of the nuclear option might have 
been, its actions left unaltered Rule XXII’s preexisting treatment of superma-
jority cloture with respect to votes on laws and resolutions, as well as Supreme 
Court nominees. Indeed, key supporters of the Senate’s November action took 
care to disclaim any support for altering Senate practice except with regard to 
executive-branch and lower-court appointee confirmation votes.282 As a result, 
the need for supermajority cloture votes remains fully in place for most matters 
of Senate business, including virtually every matter as to which the House 
needs supportive Senate action to transform bills into law.283 
Second, some observers have suggested that the Senate’s supermajority 
cloture rules are now nothing but a paper tiger, readily subject to revision 
through majoritarian use of the nuclear option at any time for any reason.284 
Thus, so the argument goes, the Senate has become a majority-vote, rather than 
a supermajority-vote, institution, and its operations therefore can no longer 
offend any governing norm of majority rule. The difficulty with this argument 
is not hard to see: As a matter of both legal command and the limited purposes 
of the Senate’s November 21 action, Rule XXII remains in place no less today 
than it did before with respect to both passing laws and confirming Supreme 
Court Justices—and this is so whether or not a determined Senate majority 
may again wield the nuclear option in the future. 
To understand why this state of affairs matters is of both legal and practi-
cal importance, it is worth recalling an analogous chapter of congressional his-
tory. When the House adopted a supermajority voting rule for tax rate increas-
es in 1995, a long list of leading constitutional scholars assailed its constitu-
tionality despite the House’s ability to change that supermajority voting rule by 
majority vote.285 The same principle applies to Senate Rule XXII as it stands 
                                                                                                                           
 282 See, e.g., 159 CONG. REC. S8415 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2013) (statement of Sen. Harry Reid); 
Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Leahy Supports Change in Senate Rules to Address Unprecedented 
Filibusters (Nov. 13, 2013), available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-supports-change-in-
senate-rules-to-address-unprecedented-filibusters-, archived at http://perma.cc/R2JQ-DBES. 
 283 Put another way, the sixty-vote requirement will continue to operate as the generally govern-
ing default rule under which the Senate will conduct all of its law-making business. And it is hard to 
see how a default rule that dictates that a supermajority vote will decide whether to enact laws can be 
squared with a constitutional norm that a majority vote must govern such decisions. See supra notes 
51–124 and accompanying text. 
 284 See, e.g., Brad Plumer, It’s Official: The Senate Just Got Rid of Part of the Filibuster, WASH. 
POST WONKBLOG (Nov. 21, 2013, 12:42 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/
2013/11/21/the-senate-just-got-rid-of-part-of-the-filibuster, archived at http://perma.cc/Y782-JLTT 
(noting comments along these lines by Senator McConnell). 
 285 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (citing to numerous scholars on this point). 
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and operates under current conditions. Indeed, it applies a fortiori because the 
scope of the Senate’s supermajority requirement reaches far beyond the narrow 
subject of tax-rate increases to embrace proposed laws and resolutions in an 
across-the-board fashion. No less important, this supposed background capaci-
ty to negate the operation of a supermajority voting rule by majority vote hard-
ly renders that supermajority voting rule an empty letter. Rather, the very label 
“nuclear option” signals the sort of distinctly extraordinary exertion that dis-
placement of Rule XXII’s supermajority-voting rules—even if by majority 
action—continues to require. 
Finally, whether or not the Senate’s limited use of the “nuclear option” 
will reverberate across all of the body’s future operations, an important ques-
tion remains: With what new filibuster regime should the Senate replace its 
past approach? In fact, two alternative reforms are available for the Senate’s 
use, each of which would remediate existing constitutional problems while 
carrying forward the upper chamber’s tradition of paying heed to minority-bloc 
concerns.286 At least, the Senate’s recent experience with the nuclear option—
as well as the uncertainty that this departure from Rule XXII has left in its 
wake—has put in clearer focus the benefits that each of these potential reforms 
would bring. 
B. The Go-Slow Approach 
How might the Senate rework Rule XXII to cure the constitutional prob-
lems it presents while still honoring the commitment to deliberate decision 
making that the institution long has worn as its badge of honor? One possibil-
ity is to adjust the cloture process to preclude a final vote on any contested 
matter in the Senate until a substantial period for consideration of the matter 
has passed. Such a go-slow approach would permit “the tea to cool,” even for 
                                                                                                                           
 286 Notably, a third reform proposal, which has been advanced by Senator Al Franken, illustrates 
the sort of rule change that would fall short of providing a proper constitutional remedy. According to 
that proposal, the existing sixty-vote Cloture Rule would be replaced with a new 41-vote rule that 
effectively requires the affirmative support of this number of Senators to halt consideration of a pend-
ing matter. Press Release, Sen. Al Franken, Sen. Franken Introduces Provision to Improve Senate 
Filibuster Rules (Jan. 6, 2011), available at http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=
1248, archived at http://perma.cc/RUP7-X6C5. Because this rule change would simply substitute one 
de facto supermajority voting requirement for another, it would fail to vindicate the constitutional 
requirement of legislative majoritarianism. Senator Michael Bennet has proposed supplementing the 
shift to a requirement that 41% of Senators vote against cloture with refinement in some circumstanc-
es—raising this 41% threshold to a higher level (e.g., 45%) if initial opponents of cloture were later to 
change their positions. See Brian R.D. Hamm, Note, Modifying the Filibuster: A Means to Foster 
Bipartisanship While Reining in Its Most Egregious Abuses, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 735, 755–56 (2012) 
(describing Senator Bennet’s proposal); see also id. at 767–70 (endorsing a revised version of Senator 
Bennet’s proposed reform). But this refinement does not address the constitutional problem presented 
by Senator Frankin’s proposal because it too would keep in place a regime of ultimate minority voting 
control. 
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an extended period, during which Senators could openly exchange ideas about, 
voice objections to, and wrangle for modifications of the pending proposal.287 
Building on this idea, stealth filibuster critics who represent a broad cross 
section of the Senate have advocated a “stair step” reform under which the 
number of votes required for cloture would gradually diminish over time.288 
Under one such proposal, for example, the vote threshold for cloture would 
move from 60% to 57% to 54% to 51% as time passes, thus providing substan-
tial opportunity for discussion and accommodation.289 To be sure, some Sena-
tors have argued that the Constitution requires a reform of this kind only for 
judicial confirmation votes, as opposed to action on bills.290 For reasons 
touched on earlier, however, this claimed distinction is not constitutionally 
sound and thus lacks legal significance.291 What is significant is that the stair 
step approach has attracted support from Senators of both political parties, par-
ticularly when their partisan interests have aligned with filibuster reform. 
Along the way, this remedy has been championed by such diverse and long-
serving members of the Senate as Bill Frist, Orrin Hatch, Joseph Lieberman, 
and Tom Harkin.292 Many other Senators have signaled their support for these 
                                                                                                                           
 287 See James L. Swanson, Editorial, Filibustering the Constitution, WASH. TIMES, May 6, 2003, 
at A18, available at http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/minority-rules-filibustering-
constitution, archived at http://perma.cc/W5L2-C9SG (defending the efforts to slow down action on 
legislation and confirmations that are “employed merely to guarantee a reasonable and limited period 
of debate before proceeding to an up or down vote”). 
 288 See infra notes 292–293 and accompanying text. Others have characterized this reform as 
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proposals as well.293 This large-scale coming together of members from both 
sides of the aisle offers telling support for the soundness of the stair step ap-
proach from the viewpoint of a dispassionate lawgiver seeking to operate from 
behind the “veil of ignorance.”294 
The stair step proposal also reflects an underlying sensitivity to governing 
constitutional principles. As noted earlier, the stealth filibuster system may be 
seen as facilitating deliberation, at least in a loose sense, by impeding quick 
Senate action.295 It has this effect, however, only because it installs the func-
tional equivalent of the sort of outright supermajority voting requirement that 
runs headlong into the constitutional principle of legislative majoritarianism.296 
Pursuing the goal of facilitating deliberation is fine, but not if it comes at the 
cost of breaching the constitutional mandate of majority decision making in 
taking dispositive action. As a result, a “less restrictive alternative”297 must be 
sought. And the sort of remedy offered by the stair step reform—even though it 
incorporates significant supermajoritarian features—represents such an alter-
native, constitutionally permissible innovation. 
In short, the stair step remedy would ensure opportunities for deliberation 
by genuinely slowing down the legislative process—and sensibly slowing it 
down most of all for matters that generate the closest divisions in Senate.298 To 
be sure, the failure to secure sixty “aye” votes at the outset would put off, per-
haps for an extended period, final action on a legislative proposal. But the stair 
step proposal differs in a critical way from the current Senate regime because, 
once the requisite time for due deliberation has run its course, a majority, ra-
ther than a supermajority, makes the final decision. The Constitution, in other 
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words, does not require an instantaneous majority vote on legislative pro-
posals. But it does require the making of determinative decisions on such pro-
posals by majority action at the end of the day.299 
C. The Talking Filibuster 
An alternative remedy would involve abandoning the stealth filibuster 
system while retaining the Rule’s sixty-vote requirement. This approach cen-
ters on the idea of redirecting Rule XXII’s supermajority voting requirement at 
true, old-fashioned filibustering—that is, open speechmaking that actually oc-
curs on the Senate floor.300 To be sure, such a system would carry forward op-
portunities for minority control of the Senate’s business. To exert that control, 
however, dissident Senators would have to hold the floor until their orations 
were shut down by a sixty-member vote directed at the actual “cloture” of de-
bate.301 
Critics might argue that this system will not provide a proper remedy on 
the theory that the sixty-member vote it envisions would itself abridge the con-
stitutional ban on supermajority decision making. They have a point. If a tena-
cious minority can hold the floor long enough to cause the proponents of a bill 
to fold their tent, the minority in effect will have determined the contested 
bill’s fate.302 There is, however, another side of the constitutional coin. If a su-
permajority voting rule targets real-life debating—in contrast to merely mirror-
ing a supermajority requirement for final votes—the case is much-strengthened 
for concluding that the rule reflects a genuine exercise of the power to fashion 
“Rules of . . . Proceedings.”303 In addition, connecting up filibuster control 
with actual speechmaking would restore the self-limiting features of the fili-
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buster mechanism and thereby diminish, perhaps to a great extent, efforts by 
minority blocs to impede action favored by Senate majorities.304 
Because refocusing the Cloture Rule on “talking filibusters” holds the 
promise of addressing core flaws in current Senate practice, it is not surprising 
that reform proposals along these lines have surfaced in recent years. In partic-
ular, Senators Mark Udall and Jeff Merkley have advocated a rule change di-
rected at cases in which out-of-the box cloture motions generate majority sup-
port but not the sixty votes now needed to proceed with the matter at hand.305 
In essence, they propose that a period of “extended debate” on that matter 
should come into effect immediately in these situations. During this period, 
objectors who trigger the operation of this extended period would have to hold 
the floor on an around-the-clock basis because any break in speaking would 
immediately empower the presiding officer to schedule a majority-controlled 
cloture vote on the filibustered proposal. The resulting majority-controlled clo-
ture vote would then presumably succeed because it was a majority vote for 
cloture that brought about the period of extended debate in the first place. And 
once a majority vote for cloture occurred, the follow-on majority vote on the 
substantive proposal would predictably succeed as well.306 
Any move to a talking-filibuster system will bring with it practical chal-
lenges. Under the Udall-Merkley proposal, for example, the Senate Majority 
Leader would retain authority to move the Senate on to other business if the 
threat of a lengthy talking filibuster arose.307 The retention of this power pre-
sents a problem because its past exercise contributed to development of the 
existing stealth filibuster system.308 Given this history, it remains unclear 
whether a talking-filibuster reform would actually produce talking filibusters. 
At the least, however, the Senate’s adoption of the Udall-Merkley proposal 
would reshuffle the filibuster deck, perhaps in a way that would often require 
minority objectors to hold the floor to defeat proposals that enjoy majority 
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support. In the end, there is no way to know if this reform will have its intend-
ed effect unless the Senate puts it in operation. And so a cautious first-step 
remedy might involve implementing a talking-filibuster reform, at least for a 
trial period. 
As we just have seen, one critique of the talking-filibuster approach is 
that it might not alter existing Senate operations in any significant way.309 An 
alternative critique is that it might change Senate operations in a way that is 
both significant and deeply harmful. On this view, if the minority party be-
comes able to achieve its obstructive goals only by resorting to true filibuster-
ing, that is exactly what the minority party will do. The result will be endless 
speechmaking on even minor matters, with the consequence that the Senate 
finds itself so tied in knots that it cannot conduct any business at all.310 
This could happen. But the future threat of self-imposed immobilization 
cannot justify the Senate’s persistence in an ongoing course of unconstitutional 
conduct. To be sure, the on-the-ground impact of talking-filibuster reform is 
unknowable, and in the short term it may generate even worse forms of legisla-
tive stalemate than now exist. But it bears reemphasis that a key purpose of 
reinstating a talking-filibuster system is to push the lawmaking process into 
more open view.311 If the result of filibuster reform is an insistence by a pas-
sionate, floor-holding minority that its policy views warrant overriding the ma-
jority’s position, that stance will be put squarely before the public for it to 
evaluate. One possible result is that the open airing of the minority’s arguments 
will cause them to win out in the forum of public opinion. Another possible 
result is that voters in time will send to Washington representatives better able 
to collaborate and compromise. The critical point is that decision making in the 
Senate—whether it involves collaboration and compromise or dissension and 
deadlock—must unfold against a backdrop of governing rules that comport 
with the Constitution’s commands. And those commands dictate that, in the 
end, Senate decision making must occur through majority, rather than super-
majority, voting. 
CONCLUSION 
Modern Senate practice centers on a stealth filibuster system that has tak-
en hold in recent decades. Despite the formal phrasing of Rule XXII, this sys-
tem does not focus on controlling floor debate. Instead, its practical effect is to 
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require supermajority action to pass proposed bills and take other critical ac-
tions. As a result, that system offends the Constitution because the Framers 
required dispositive decision making in both houses of Congress to proceed by 
majority, not supermajority, vote. 
The Senate enjoys a proud tradition of collegiality and interparty collabo-
ration. In recent years, however, that tradition has morphed into a regime of 
minority-vote control. In due time, the courts may remedy this constitutional 
wrong. Before courts act, however, the Senate should search its own soul. 
Workable remedies that would counteract hastiness and facilitate deliberation 
in the law-making process are there for the Senate to install, even while honor-
ing the overarching constitutional norm of legislative majoritarianism. It is 
time for the Senate to embrace such a remedy, regardless of what party now 
holds a majority of seats or may come to hold a majority of seats in the next 
election or the next or the next. Deteriorating public perceptions of the Senate 
counsel such a reform. But, of even greater importance, our Constitution re-
quires it. 
